

# Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

Mauricio Romero

## Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

### Cobb-Douglas

Using calculus

Perfect substitutes

Perfect complements

## Cobb-Douglas

$$u_A(x, y) = x^\alpha y^{1-\alpha}$$

$$u_B(x, y) = x^\beta y^{1-\beta}$$

For graph suppose


$$\alpha = 0.7$$

$$\beta = 0.3$$

$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$

$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

# Cobb-Douglas



## Cobb-Douglas

- ▶ Indifference curves must be tangent (formalize this later)
- ▶ Thus, the MRS must be equalized across the two consumers

$$MRS_{x,y}^A = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A}$$

$$MRS_{x,y}^B = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

## Cobb-Douglas

- ▶ Indifference curves must be tangent (formalize this later)
- ▶ Thus, the MRS must be equalized across the two consumers

$$MRS_{x,y}^A = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A}$$

$$MRS_{x,y}^B = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

## Cobb-Douglas

- ▶ Indifference curves must be tangent (formalize this later)
- ▶ Thus, the MRS must be equalized across the two consumers

$$MRS_{x,y}^A = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A}$$

$$MRS_{x,y}^B = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A}$$

## Cobb-Douglas

- ▶ Indifference curves must be tangent (formalize this later)
- ▶ Thus, the MRS must be equalized across the two consumers

$$MRS_{x,y}^A = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A}$$

$$MRS_{x,y}^B = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$


$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A}$$

$$y^A = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y x^A}{\omega_x + \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} - 1 \right) x^A}$$



# Cobb-Douglas



## Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

Cobb-Douglas

**Using calculus**

Perfect substitutes

Perfect complements

## Using calculus

Essentially in this exercise we are doing the following:

$$\max_{(x^A, y^A), (x^B, y^B)} u_A(x^A, y^A) \text{ such that}$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) \geq \underline{u}_B = u_B(x^{B*}, y^{B*})$$

$$x^B + x^A \leq \omega_x,$$

$$y^B + y^A \leq \omega_y.$$

## Theorem

Consider an Edgeworth Box economy and suppose that all consumers have strictly monotone utility functions. Then a feasible allocation  $(x^{A*}, y^{A*}, x^{B*}, y^{B*})$  is Pareto efficient if and only if it solves

$$\max_{(x^A, y^A), (x^B, y^B)} u_A(x^A, y^A) \text{ such that}$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) \geq \underline{u}_B = u_B(x^{B*}, y^{B*})$$

$$x^B + x^A \leq \omega_x,$$

$$y^B + y^A \leq \omega_y.$$

- ▶ Very tempting to use lagrangeans, no?
- ▶ We need to assume all consumers have quasi-concave, strictly monotone, differentiable utility functions

Then we can solve:

$$\max_{(x^A, y^A)} u_A(x^A, y^A) + \lambda(u_B(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A) - \underline{u}_B).$$

Lets take the first order conditions of the above problem:

$$\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial x}(x^{A*}, y^{A*}) = \lambda \frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x}(\omega_x - x^{A*}, \omega_y - x^{B*})$$

$$\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial y}(x^{A*}, y^{A*}) = \lambda \frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y}(\omega_x - x^{A*}, \omega_y - x^{B*})$$

If  $(x^{A^*}, y^{A^*}, x^{B^*}, y^{B^*})$  is Pareto efficient then

$$\frac{\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial x}(x^{A^*}, y^{A^*})}{\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial y}(x^{A^*}, y^{A^*})} = \frac{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x}(\omega_x - x^{A^*}, \omega_y - y^{A^*})}{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y}(\omega_x - x^{A^*}, \omega_y - y^{A^*})} = \frac{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x}(x^{B^*}, y^{B^*})}{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y}(x^{B^*}, y^{B^*})}.$$

► In short  $MRS_{x,y}^A = MRS_{x,y}^B$

► This condition is *necessary* and *sufficient*

## Theorem

Suppose that both consumers have utility functions that are quasi-concave and strictly increasing. Suppose that  $(x^{A^*}, y^{A^*}, \omega_x - x^{A^*}, \omega_y - y^{A^*})$  is an **interior** feasible allocation. Then  $(x^{A^*}, y^{A^*}, \omega_x - x^{A^*}, \omega_y - y^{A^*})$  is Pareto efficient if and only if

$$\frac{\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial x}(x^{A^*}, y^{A^*})}{\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial y}(x^{A^*}, y^{A^*})} = \frac{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x}(\omega_x - x^{A^*}, \omega_y - y^{A^*})}{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y}(\omega_x - x^{A^*}, \omega_y - y^{A^*})} = \frac{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x}(x^{B^*}, y^{B^*})}{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y}(x^{B^*}, y^{B^*})}.$$



## Intuition

Suppose that we are at an allocation where

$MRS_{x,y}^A = 2 > MRS_{x,y}^B = 1$ . Can we make both consumers better off?

## Intuition

Suppose that we are at an allocation where  $MRS_{x,y}^A = 2 > MRS_{x,y}^B = 1$ . Can we make both consumers better off?

- ▶  $A$  gives up 1 unit of  $y$  to person  $B$  in exchange for unit of  $x$
- ▶  $B$  is indifferent since his  $MRS_{x,y}^B = 1$ .
- ▶  $A$  receives a unit of  $x$  and only needs to give one unit of  $y$  (he was willing to give two)
- ▶ We have reallocated goods to make  $A$  strictly better off without hurting  $B$

## General case

$$\max_{((x_1^1, \dots, x_L^1), \dots, (x_1^I, \dots, x_L^I))} u_1(x_1^1, \dots, x_L^1) \text{ such that } u_2(x_1^2, \dots, x_L^2) \geq \underline{u}_2,$$

$$\vdots$$

$$u_I(x_1^I, \dots, x_L^I) \geq \underline{u}_I,$$

$$x_1^1 + \dots + x_1^I \leq \omega_1,$$

$$\vdots$$

$$x_L^1 + \dots + x_L^I \leq \omega_L.$$

### Theorem

*Suppose that all utility functions are strictly increasing and quasi-concave. Suppose also that  $((\hat{x}_1^1, \dots, \hat{x}_L^1), \dots, (\hat{x}_1^I, \dots, \hat{x}_L^I))$  is a feasible interior allocation. Then  $((\hat{x}_1^1, \dots, \hat{x}_L^1), \dots, (\hat{x}_1^I, \dots, \hat{x}_L^I))$  is Pareto efficient if and only if  $((\hat{x}_1^1, \dots, \hat{x}_L^1), \dots, (\hat{x}_1^I, \dots, \hat{x}_L^I))$  exhausts all resources **and** for all pairs of goods  $\ell, \ell'$ ,*

$$MRS_{\ell, \ell'}^1(\hat{x}_1^1, \dots, \hat{x}_L^1) = \dots = MRS_{\ell, \ell'}^I(\hat{x}_1^I, \dots, \hat{x}_L^I).$$

- ▶ Utility functions must be strictly increasing, quasi-concave, and differentiable!

## Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

Cobb-Douglas

Using calculus

**Perfect substitutes**

Perfect complements

## Perfect substitutes

Suppose that


$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$$

$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$


$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

## Perfect substitutes







## Perfect substitutes




## Perfect substitutes



## Perfect substitutes



## Perfect substitutes



## Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

Cobb-Douglas

Using calculus

Perfect substitutes

**Perfect complements**

## Perfect complements


Suppose that


$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, 2y^A)$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = \min(2x^B, y^B)$$


$$\omega^A = (3, 1)$$


$$\omega^B = (1, 3)$$




















Make A as well as we can without making B worse off




Make A as well as we can without making B worse off



Make A as well as we can without making B worse off




Make A as well as we can without making B worse off








Make A as well as we can without making B worse off





Make A as well as we can without making B worse off

























▶ What about:  $u_A(x, y) = x^2 + y^2$ ,  $u_B(x, y) = x + y$  ?

▶ Try it at home!

## Recap

- ▶ We expect all exchanges to happen on the contract curve (hence its name)
- ▶ We expect all **voluntary** exchanges to be in the orange box
- ▶ Can we say more? Not without prices