Lecture 3: General Equilibrium

Mauricio Romero



Competitive equilibrium

Examples: Cobb-Douglas

Examples: Perfect Complements

Examples: Perfect Substitutes

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Hidden assumptions

- There is a market for each good
- Every agent can access the market without any cost
- There is a unique price for each good and all consumers know this price
- Each consumer can sell her initial endowment in the market and use the income to buy goods and services
- Consumers seek to maximize their utility given their budget restriction, independently of what everyone else is doing.
 - There is no centralized mechanism
 - People may not know others preferences or endowments
- There is perfect competition (i.e., everyone is a price taker)
- The only source of information agents are prices

Competitive equilibrium - Definition

Definition

A pair of an allocation and a price vector, $(x^*, p = (p_1, \dots, p_L))$ is called a competitive equilibrium if the following conditions hold:

1. For all consumers i = 1, 2, ..., I, $x^{i^*} = (x_1^{i^*}, ..., x_L^{i^*})$ solves the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{x^i} u_i(x^i)$$

such that $p\cdot x^i \leq p\cdot \omega^i = \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell \omega^i_\ell.$

2. Markets clear: For each commodity $\ell = 1, 2, ..., L$, the following equation holds:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{l} x_{\ell}^{i^*} = \sum_{i=1}^{l} \omega_{\ell}^{i}.$$

Competitive equilibrium - Properties

Remark

Suppose that at least one consumer has strictly monotone preferences. Then if (x^*, p) is a competitive equilibrium, $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_L > 0$.

Remark

Suppose that at least one consumer has weakly monotone preferences. Then if (x^*, p) is a competitive equilibrium, there for at least one ℓ , $p_{\ell} > 0$.

Remark

If (x^*, p) is a competitive equilibrium, then (x^*, cp) for $c \in \mathbb{R}_++$ is also a competitive equilibrium.

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Competitive equilibrium - Walras' Law

Theorem (Walras' Law)

Suppose that consumer i has weakly monotone preferences and that $\hat{x}^i \in x^{i^*}(p)$. Then

$$p \cdot \hat{x}^i = \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell \hat{x}^i_\ell = \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell \omega^i_\ell = p \cdot \omega^i.$$

Theorem (Walras' Law - II)

Suppose that utility functions are **weakly** monotonic. Suppose that $p = (p_1, ..., p_L)$ is such that $p_L > 0$. Take any (x^*, p) in which Condition 1 holds for each consumer i = 1, 2, ..., I and markets clear for all commodities $\ell = 1, 2, ..., L - 1$. Then the market clearing condition will hold for commodity L as well.

For each consumer *i*, we must

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell {x^i_\ell}^* = \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell \omega^i_\ell.$$

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For each consumer *i*, we must

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell x_\ell^{j*} = \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell \omega_\ell^i.$$

If we sum the above across all I consumers, then we get:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} x_{\ell}^{i^{*}} = \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} \omega_{\ell}^{i}.$$

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Re-arranging:

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} \sum_{i=1}^{I} p_{\ell} x_{\ell}^{i^{*}} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} \sum_{i=1}^{I} p_{\ell} \omega_{\ell}^{i}.$$

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For each consumer *i*, we must

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} x_{\ell}^{i^*} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} \omega_{\ell}^{i}.$$

If we sum the above across all I consumers, then we get:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{l} \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} x_{\ell}^{i^*} = \sum_{i=1}^{l} \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} \omega_{\ell}^{i}.$$

Re-arranging:

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{L}\sum_{i=1}^{I}p_{\ell}{x_{\ell}^{i}}^{*}=\sum_{\ell=1}^{L}\sum_{i=1}^{I}p_{\ell}\omega_{\ell}^{i}.$$

Re-arranging:

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \left(x_{\ell}^{i*} - \omega_{\ell}^{i} \right) = 0.$$

 $\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} \sum_{i=1}^{l} \left(x_{\ell}^{i^*} - \omega_{\ell}^{i} \right) = 0.$



$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} \sum_{i=1}^{l} \left(x_{\ell}^{i^*} - \omega_{\ell}^{i} \right) = 0.$$





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 $\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \left(x_{\ell}^{i^*} - \omega_{\ell}^{i} \right) = 0.$

 $p_L \sum_{i=1}^{\prime} \left(x_L^{i^*} - \omega_L^i \right) = 0.$

 $\sum_{i=1}^{I} \left(x_L^{i*} - \omega_L^i \right) = 0.$

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$$u_A(x, y) = x^{\alpha} y^{1-\alpha}$$
$$u_B(x, y) = x^{\beta} y^{1-\beta}$$

Suppose

$$egin{aligned} &lpha = 0.5 \ η = 0.5 \end{aligned}$$
 $eta^A = (1.5, 0.5) \ &\omega^B = (0.5, 1.5) \end{aligned}$

Each individual solves

$$max\sqrt{x^iy^i}$$

s.t.

$$p_x x^i + p_y y^i \leq p_x w_x^i + p_y w_y^i$$

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Each individual solves

max
$$\sqrt{x^iy^i}$$

s.t.

$$p_x x^i + p_y y^i \leq p_x w_x^i + p_y w_y^i$$

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We can set up a Lagrangean.

Each individual solves

max
$$\sqrt{x^iy^i}$$

s.t.

$$p_x x^i + p_y y^i \le p_x w_x^i + p_y w_y^i$$

We can set up a Lagrangean. The FOC are:

$$\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\frac{y^{i}}{x^{i}}} = \lambda p_{x}$$
$$\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\frac{x^{i}}{y^{i}}} = \lambda p_{y}$$

Thus,

$$\frac{y^{i}}{x^{i}} = \frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}}$$
$$y^{i} = x^{i} \frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}}$$

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Thus,

$$\frac{y^{i}}{x^{i}} = \frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}}$$
$$y^{i} = x^{i} \frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}}$$

We haven't used the budget restriction!



Thus,

$$\frac{y^{i}}{x^{i}} = \frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}}$$
$$y^{i} = x^{i} \frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}}$$

We haven't used the budget restriction!

$$p_{x}x^{i} + p_{y}y^{i} = p_{x}w_{x}^{i} + p_{y}w_{y}^{i}$$

$$p_{x}x^{i} + p_{y}x^{i}\frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}} = p_{x}w_{x}^{i} + p_{y}w_{y}^{i}$$

$$x^{i} = \frac{w_{x}p_{x} + w_{y}p_{y}}{2p_{x}}$$

$$y^{i} = \frac{w_{x}p_{x} + w_{y}p_{y}}{2p_{y}}$$

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$$x^{A} = \frac{1.5p_{x} + 0.5p_{y}}{2p_{x}}$$
$$y^{A} = \frac{1.5p_{x} + 0.5p_{y}}{2p_{y}}$$
$$x^{B} = \frac{0.5p_{x} + 1.5p_{y}}{2p_{x}}$$
$$y^{B} = \frac{0.5p_{x} + 1.5p_{y}}{2p_{y}}$$

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Now we can use condition 2 (market clear)

$$x^{A} = \frac{1.5p_{x} + 0.5p_{y}}{2p_{x}}$$
$$y^{A} = \frac{1.5p_{x} + 0.5p_{y}}{2p_{y}}$$
$$x^{B} = \frac{0.5p_{x} + 1.5p_{y}}{2p_{x}}$$
$$y^{B} = \frac{0.5p_{x} + 1.5p_{y}}{2p_{y}}$$

Now we can use condition 2 (market clear)

$$x^{A} + x^{B} = 2$$
$$y^{A} + y^{B} = 2$$

$$\frac{1.5p_x + 0.5p_y}{2p_x} + \frac{0.5p_x + 1.5p_y}{2p_x} = 2$$
$$\frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$$

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$$\frac{1.5p_x + 0.5p_y}{2p_x} + \frac{0.5p_x + 1.5p_y}{2p_x} = 2$$
$$\frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$$
$$x^A = x^B = y^A = y^B = 1$$

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Examples: Cobb-Douglas

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Suppose that

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, 2y^A)$$
$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = \min(2x^B, y^B)$$
$$\omega^A = (3, 1)$$
$$\omega^B = (1, 3)$$



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At a given price vector, consumer A can buy any combination (x^A, y^A) such that:

$$p_x w_x^A + p_y w_y^A \le p_x x^A + p_y y^A$$

At a given price vector, consumer A can buy any combination (x^A, y^A) such that:

$$p_{x}w_{x}^{A}+p_{y}w_{y}^{A}\leq p_{x}x^{A}+p_{y}y^{A}$$

or equivalently

$$y^{A} \leq \frac{p_{X}w_{X}^{A} + p_{Y}w_{Y}^{A}}{p_{Y}} - \frac{p_{X}}{p_{Y}}x^{A}$$

At a given price vector, consumer A can buy any combination (x^A, y^A) such that:

$$p_{x}w_{x}^{A}+p_{y}w_{y}^{A}\leq p_{x}x^{A}+p_{y}y^{A}$$

or equivalently

$$y^{A} \leq \frac{p_{X}w_{X}^{A} + p_{y}w_{y}^{A}}{p_{y}} - \frac{p_{X}}{p_{y}}x^{A}$$

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How does this looks in the Edgeworth box?

 $rac{p_{\chi}}{p_{y}} < 1$



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 $rac{p_x}{p_y} < 1$



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A can buy whats below the orange line, B what is above

 $rac{p_x}{p_y} < 1$



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Excess demand of Y and excess supply of X

 $rac{p_x}{p_y} > 1$



 $rac{p_x}{p_y} > 1$



 $rac{p_x}{p_y} > 1$



 $rac{p_x}{p_y}=1$



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No excess demand or supply

What about zero prices?



Excess demand of X? (and Y balanced?)



Excess demand of X? (and Y balanced?) Not really since both A and B are indifference over a wide range that would make the market clear

 $p_y = 0$



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Excess demand of Y? (and X balanced?)

 $p_y = 0$



Excess demand of Y? (and X balanced?) Not really since both A and B are indifference over a wide range that would make the market clear To sum up...

- There are multiple equilibria
- ▶ There are three price vectors associated with these equilibria
- One price vector has a unique resource allocation associated with it
- Two price vectors ($p_x = 0$ and $p_y = 0$) have *infinity* resource allocations associated with them

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Try at home:

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, y^A)$$
$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = \min(x^B, y^B)$$
$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$
$$\omega^B = (3, 1)$$

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$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$$
$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$$
$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$
$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

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$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$$
$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$$
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$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

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 $p_x > 0$ and $p_y > 0$, why?

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$$
$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$$
$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$
$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

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 $p_x > 0$ and $p_y > 0$, why? hence, normalize $p_x = 1$

The demand for goods of individual A is

$$X^{A} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p_{y} < 2\\ [0, I] & \text{if } p_{y} = 2\\ I & \text{if } p_{y} > 2 \end{cases}$$
$$Y^{A} = \begin{cases} \frac{l/p_{y}}{l} & \text{if } p_{y} < 2\\ [0, \frac{l/p_{y}}{l} & \text{if } p_{y} = 2\\ 0 & \text{if } p_{y} > 2 \end{cases}$$

The demand for goods of individual B is

$$X^{A} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p_{y} < 1 \\ [0, I] & \text{if } p_{y} = 1 \\ I & \text{if } p_{y} > 1 \end{cases}$$
$$Y^{A} = \begin{cases} \frac{l/p_{y}}{l} & \text{if } p_{y} < 1 \\ [0, \frac{l/p_{y}}{l} & \text{if } p_{y} = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } p_{y} > 1 \end{cases}$$

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When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

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▶ Try *p*_y < 1

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

Try
$$p_y < 1$$

$$\blacktriangleright X^A = 0 \text{ and } X^B = 0$$

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

• Try
$$p_y < 1$$

•
$$X^A = 0$$
 and $X^B = 0$

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

• Try
$$p_y < 1$$

•
$$X^{A} = 0$$
 and $X^{B} = 0$

- ▶ Try *p*_y = 1
- ▶ $X^A = 0$ and $X^B = [0, 2]$

• One possible equilibrium ($X^A = 0, X^B = 2, Y^A = 2, Y^B = 0$)

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When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

• Try
$$p_y < 1$$

•
$$X^{A} = 0$$
 and $X^{B} = 0$

- ▶ Try *p*_y = 1
- $X^A = 0$ and $X^B = [0, 2]$
- One possible equilibrium $(X^A = 0, X^B = 2, Y^A = 2, Y^B = 0)$

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When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

• Try
$$p_y < 1$$

•
$$X^{A} = 0$$
 and $X^{B} = 0$

• Try $p_y = 1$

•
$$X^A = 0$$
 and $X^B = [0, 2]$

• One possible equilibrium ($X^A = 0, X^B = 2, Y^A = 2, Y^B = 0$)

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

• Try
$$p_y < 1$$

•
$$X^A = 0$$
 and $X^B = 0$

• Try $p_y = 1$

•
$$X^A = 0$$
 and $X^B = [0, 2]$

• One possible equilibrium ($X^A = 0, X^B = 2, Y^A = 2, Y^B = 0$)

Try
$$1 < p_y < 2$$

 $X^A = 0$ and $X^B = I$

• But
$$I = w_x p_x + w_y p_y = 1 + p_y > 2$$

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

• Try
$$p_y < 1$$

•
$$X^{A} = 0$$
 and $X^{B} = 0$

Try $p_y = 1$

•
$$X^A = 0$$
 and $X^B = [0, 2]$

• One possible equilibrium ($X^A = 0, X^B = 2, Y^A = 2, Y^B = 0$)

Try
$$p_y = 2$$

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good y?)

•
$$X^{A} = 0$$
 and $X^{B} = 0$

Try $p_y = 1$

•
$$X^A = 0$$
 and $X^B = [0, 2]$

• One possible equilibrium ($X^A = 0, X^B = 2, Y^A = 2, Y^B = 0$)

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