Mauricio Romero



Is there always an equilibrium?

Is the equilibrium unique?

First welfare theorem

Second welfare theorem

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Is there always an equilibrium?

Is the equilibrium unique?

First welfare theorem

Second welfare theorem

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The answer is going to be yes in general

We will show that the equilibrium is a "fix point" of a certain function

Intuitively, if we have a function that adjusts prices (higher price is demand > supply), then the equilibrium is where this function stops updating

Is there always an equilibrium? An intro to fix point theorems


Is the equilibrium unique?

First welfare theorem

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
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Try to draw a line from A to B without crossing the diagonal



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
Try to draw a line from A to B without crossing the diagonal



Its impossible!

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For example...



There is even a theorem for this:

Theorem

For any function $f : [0,1] \rightarrow [0,1]$ that is continuous, there exists an $x^* \in [0,1]$ such that $f(x^*) = x^*$

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And a more general version!

Theorem

For any function $f : \triangle^{L-1} \to \triangle^{L-1}$ that is continuous, there exists a point $p^* = (p_1^*, p_2^*, ..., p_L^*)$ such that

$$f(p^*)=p^*.$$

where

$$riangle^{L-1} = \{(p_1, p_2, ..., p_L) \in \mathbb{R}^L_+ \mid \sum_{l=1}^L p_l = 1\}$$

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Prove the existence of a general equilibrium in a market

We will show that the equilibrium is a "fix point" of a certain function

Intuitively, if we have a function that adjusts prices (higher price if demand > supply), then the equilibrium is where this function stops updating

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Is there always an equilibrium? An intro to fix point theorems The walrasian auctioneer

Is the equilibrium unique?

First welfare theorem

Second welfare theorem

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Let us define the excess demand by:

$$Z(p) = (Z_1(p), Z_2(p), ..., Z_L(p)) = \sum_{i=1}^{l} x^{*i}(p) - \sum_{i=1}^{l} w^i$$

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$$Z(p) = (Z_1(p), Z_2(p), ..., Z_L(p)) = \sum_{i=1}^{l} x^{*i}(p) - \sum_{i=1}^{l} w^i$$

since $x^{*i}(p)$ is the demand (i.e., consumers are already maximizing) then we have the following result:

Remark

 $p \in \mathbb{R}^n_{++}$ is a competitive equilibrium if and only if Z(p) = 0

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Z(p) has the following properties

1. Is continuous in p

2. Is homogeneous of degree zero

3.
$$p \cdot Z(p) = 0$$
 (this is equivalent to Walra's law)

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Z(p) has the following properties

1. Is continuous in p

2. Is homogeneous of degree zero

3. $p \cdot Z(p) = 0$ (this is equivalent to Walra's law) — Think about this!

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We said we want to update prices in a "logical" way. If excess demand is positive, then increase prices...

We said we want to update prices in a "logical" way. If excess demand is positive, then increase prices...

$$p' = p + Z(p)$$

But what if p' < 0? Ok then

$$T(p) = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{L} p_i + max(0, Z_i(p))} (p_1 + max(0, Z_1(p)), max(0, Z_2(p)), \dots, p_L + max(0, Z_L(p)))$$

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T is continuous

Thus we can apply the fix point theorem

• Therefore there exists a
$$p^*$$
 such that $T(p^*) = p^*$

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• Then
$$Z(p^*) = 0$$

T is continuous

Thus we can apply the fix point theorem

▶ Therefore there exists a p^* such that $T(p^*) = p^*$

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So when does it break down?

We needed demand to be continuous!

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$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, y^A)$$
$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = \max(x^B, y^B)$$
$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$
$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

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prices are positive (why?)



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prices are positive (why?)

• normalize
$$p_x = 1$$

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, y^A)$$
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$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$
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prices are positive (why?)

• normalize $p_x = 1$

▶ if p_y < 1 then B wants to demand as much of y as possible Y^b = ¹/_{p_y} + 1

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prices are positive (why?)

• normalize $p_x = 1$

If p_y < 1 then B wants to demand as much of y as possible Y^b = ¹/_{p_y} + 1

▶ if p_y > 1 then B wants to demand as much of x as possible X^b = p_y + 1

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, y^A)$$
$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = \max(x^B, y^B)$$
$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$
$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

prices are positive (why?)

- normalize $p_x = 1$
- If p_y < 1 then B wants to demand as much of y as possible Y^b = ¹/_{p_y} + 1
- If p_y > 1 then B wants to demand as much of x as possible X^b = p_y + 1
- If p_y = 1 then B either demands two units of X or two units of Y, but A demands at least one unit of each good

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Is the equilibrium unique?

First welfare theorem

Second welfare theorem

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Is the equilibrium unique?

We have seen it is not



Is there always an equilibrium?

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Is there always an equilibrium?

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First welfare theorem

Second welfare theorem

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Theorem

Consider any pure exchange economy. Suppose that all consumers have weakly monotone utility functions. Then if (x^*, p) is a competitive equilibrium, then x^* is a Pareto efficient allocation.

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Proof

By contradiction:

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Proof

By contradiction: Assume that $(p, (x^1, x^2, ..., x^l))$ is a competitive equilibrium but that $(x^1, x^2, ..., x^l)$ is not Pareto efficient

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Proof

By contradiction: Assume that $(p, (x^1, x^2, ..., x^l))$ is a competitive equilibrium but that $(x^1, x^2, ..., x^l)$ is not Pareto efficient Then there is an allocation $(\widehat{x}^1, \widehat{x}^2, ..., \widehat{x}^l)$ such that

is feasible

▶ pareto dominates
$$(x^1, x^2, ..., x^I)$$

By contradiction: Assume that $(p, (x^1, x^2, ..., x^l))$ is a competitive equilibrium but that $(x^1, x^2, ..., x^l)$ is not Pareto efficient Then there is an allocation $(\widehat{x}^1, \widehat{x}^2, ..., \widehat{x}^l)$ such that

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is feasible

1.
$$\sum_{i=1}^{l} \hat{x}^i = \sum_{i=1}^{l} w^i$$

2. For all *i*,
$$u^i(\widehat{x}^i) \ge u^i(x^i)$$

3. For some
$$i^*$$
, $u^{i^*}(\widehat{x}^{i^*}) > u^{i^*}(x^{i^*})$

By definition of an equilibrium we have that

• Condition 3 in the previous slide implies $p \cdot \hat{x}^{i^*} > p \cdot w^{i^*}$

By definition of an equilibrium we have that

• Condition 3 in the previous slide implies $p \cdot \hat{x}^{i^*} > p \cdot w^{i^*}$

• Otherwise, why didn't i^* pick \hat{x}^{i^*} to begin with

• Condition 2 in the previous slide implies that for all *i*, $p \cdot \hat{x}^i \ge p \cdot w^i$

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By definition of an equilibrium we have that

- Condition 3 in the previous slide implies $p \cdot \hat{x}^{i^*} > p \cdot w^{i^*}$
 - Otherwise, why didn't i^* pick \hat{x}^{i^*} to begin with
- Condition 2 in the previous slide implies that for all *i*, $p \cdot \hat{x}^i \ge p \cdot w^i$

Adding over all agents we get:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{l} p \cdot \widehat{x}^{i} > \sum_{i=1}^{l} p \cdot w^{i}$$

By definition of an equilibrium we have that

- Condition 3 in the previous slide implies $p \cdot \hat{x}^{i^*} > p \cdot w^{i^*}$
 - Otherwise, why didn't i^* pick \hat{x}^{i^*} to begin with
- Condition 2 in the previous slide implies that for all i, p ⋅ xⁱ ≥ p ⋅ wⁱ

Adding over all agents we get:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{l} p \cdot \widehat{x}^{i} > \sum_{i=1}^{l} p \cdot w^{i}$$

Which in turn implies

$$p \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{l} \widehat{x}^i > p \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{l} w^i$$

By definition of an equilibrium we have that

- Condition 3 in the previous slide implies $p \cdot \hat{x}^{i^*} > p \cdot w^{i^*}$
 - Otherwise, why didn't i^* pick \hat{x}^{i^*} to begin with
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Adding over all agents we get:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{l} p \cdot \widehat{x}^{i} > \sum_{i=1}^{l} p \cdot w^{i}$$

Which in turn implies

$$p \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{l} \widehat{x}^i > p \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{l} w^i$$

Which contradicts what Condition 1 in the previous slide implies.

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This may be useful in calculating competitive equilibrium... we only have to search within Pareto efficient allocations

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How about the opposite?

This may be useful in calculating competitive equilibrium... we only have to search within Pareto efficient allocations

How about the opposite?

 Maybe we "like" one Pareto allocation over another (for bio-ethic considerations)

This may be useful in calculating competitive equilibrium... we only have to search within Pareto efficient allocations

How about the opposite?

- Maybe we "like" one Pareto allocation over another (for bio-ethic considerations)
- Can any Pareto efficient allocation can be sustained as the outcome of some competitive equilibrium?

This may be useful in calculating competitive equilibrium... we only have to search within Pareto efficient allocations

How about the opposite?

- Maybe we "like" one Pareto allocation over another (for bio-ethic considerations)
- Can any Pareto efficient allocation can be sustained as the outcome of some competitive equilibrium?

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Not in general...

This may be useful in calculating competitive equilibrium... we only have to search within Pareto efficient allocations

How about the opposite?

- Maybe we "like" one Pareto allocation over another (for bio-ethic considerations)
- Can any Pareto efficient allocation can be sustained as the outcome of some competitive equilibrium?
- Not in general... but what if we allow for a redistribution of resources?

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Lecture 4: General Equilibrium

Is there always an equilibrium?

Is the equilibrium unique?

First welfare theorem

Second welfare theorem

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Lecture 4: General Equilibrium

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Second welfare theorem

Theorem

Given an economy $\mathcal{E} = \langle \mathcal{I}, (u^i, w^i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \rangle$ where all consumers have weakly monotone, quasi-concave utility functions. If $(x^1, x^2, ..., x^l)$ is a Pareto optimal allocation then there exists a redistribution of resources $(\widehat{w}^1, \widehat{w}^2, ..., \widehat{w}^l)$ and some prices $p = (p_1, p_2, ..., p_L)$ such that:

1.
$$\sum_{i=1}^{l} \widehat{w}^{i} = \sum_{i=1}^{l} w^{i}$$

2. $(p, (x^{1}, x^{2}, ..., x^{l}))$ is a competitive equilibrium of the economy $\mathcal{E} = \left\langle \mathcal{I}, (u^{i}, \widehat{w}^{i})_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \right\rangle$

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> You just need to redistribute the endowments

You just need to redistribute the endowments

Ok... but what re-distribution should I do to achieve a certain outcome? No idea

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• Ok... but how can we do this redistribution?

You just need to redistribute the endowments

Ok... but what re-distribution should I do to achieve a certain outcome? No idea

Ok... but how can we do this redistribution? Not taxes, since they produce dead-weight loss

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In contrast to the first welfare theorem, we require an additional assumption that all utility functions are quasi-concave.

What if they are not? consider the following:

$$u_A(x, y) = \max\{x, y\}$$
$$u_B(x, y) = \min\{x, y\}$$
$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$
$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

In this example, all points in the Edgeworth Box are Pareto efficient. However we cannot obtain any of these points as a competitive equilibrium after transfers.