
## Lecture 11


martes, 16 de marzo de 2021 01:17 p.m.

# Pur lecture1

Lecture11	
Lecture 11: Game Theory // Preliminaries	s and dominance
Mauricio Romero	
	(0) (Ø) (2) (2) 2 OQC
Lecture 11: Game Theory $//$ Preliminaries and dominance	
Introduction - Continued	
Static games with complete information	
	(ロ)(の)(2)(2) 夏 の(0)
Lecture 11: Game Theory $//$ Preliminaries and dominance	
Introduction - Continued	
Lecture 10: Game Theory // Preliminaries and dominance	(D)(Ø)(2)(2)(2)(2)
Introduction - Continued Normal or extensive form Extensive form	
Some important remarks Some examples What's next	
Dominance of Strategies	
	101100121121 2 DQC
► We will represent games in two different ways	



A plays first, then B $1_4 \circ (1000, -100)$ $2_3 \circ (-1000, 100)$		(2.2) VICOL, - (00) (2.2) VICOL, - (00) (1000.1000) (1000.1000) (1000.1000)	0) G'Uace B x A 3064 L	; (1, 2); (2,1); (2,2 o'leace B <sup>31 A</sup> Suga
Prisoner's Dilemma		10+19+1\$+1\$+ \$ 950		
arrested an imprisoned. Ea communicating with the of pair on the principal charge prosecutor offers each priso	{1, 2} that are members of a dr ch prisoner is in solitary confine ther. The prosecutors lack enou e so they must settle for a lessen oner a deal. Each prisoner is giv ifying the other committed the J stay silent.	ment with no means of gh evidence to convict the charge. Simultaneously, the en the opportunity to either		
		10+10+12+12+ 2 OQC		
Prisoner's Dilemma				
Prisoner's Dilemma		(口) (日) (王) (王) (王) 王 の(の		
The strategies of player 1: The strategies of player 2:	$S_1 = \{\underbrace{betray_1, silent_1}_{S_2}\}.$ $S_2 = \{betray_2, silent_2\}.$			
		(a) (Ø) (2) (3) 2 OQO		
Prisoner's Dilemma		FOILON A Normal		
The strategies of player 1: The strategies of player 2:	$S_1 = \{ betray_1, silent_1 \}.$ $S_2 = \{ betray_2, silent_2 \}.$	Normac		
The utility function of the	players is given by: $u_1(b_1, b_2) = -2, u_2(b_1, b_2) = -$ $u_1(b_1, s_2) = 0, u_2(b_1, s_2) = -3$ $u_1(s_1, b_2) = -3, u_2(s_1, b_2) = 0$	2		



- This is in many case the most natural way to represent a way, but always not the most useful
- $\blacktriangleright\,$  A famous game theorist once told me the extensive form was for "weak minds" the normal form should suffice to analyze any game
- I'm clearly far from being so brilliant... and thus use the extensive form all the time

- This is in many case the most natural way to represent a way, but always not the most useful
- A famous game theorist once told me the extensive form was for "weak minds" the normal form should suffice to analyze any game
- I'm clearly far from being so brilliant... and thus use the extensive form all the time
- $\blacktriangleright$  To represent the game in extensive form you need:

- This is in many case the most natural way to represent a way, but always not the most useful
- A famous game theorist once told me the extensive form was for "weak minds" the normal form should suffice to analyze any game
- I'm clearly far from being so brilliant... and thus use the extensive form all the time
- To represent the game in extensive form you need:
   A list of players


- $\blacktriangleright\,$  This is in many case the most natural way to represent a way, but always not the most useful
- $\blacktriangleright\,$  A famous game theorist once told me the extensive form was for "weak minds" the normal form should suffice to analyze any game
- I'm clearly far from being so brilliant... and thus use the extensive form all the time
- To represent the game in extensive form you need:
   A list of players
   The information available to each player in each point in time


- This is in many case the most natural way to represent a way, but always not the most useful
- A famous game theorist once told me the extensive form was for "weak minds" the normal form should suffice to analyze any game
- I'm clearly far from being so brilliant... and thus use the extensive form all the time
- To represent the game in extensive form you need:


  - A list of players
     The information available to each player in each point in time
     The actions available to each player in each point in time

# LEXTENSIVA

- This is in many case the most natural way to represent a way, but always not the most useful
- A famous game theorist once told me the extensive form was for "weak minds" the normal form should suffice to analyze any game
- I'm clearly far from being so brilliant... and thus use the extensive form all the time
- To represent the game in extensive form you need: A list of players The information available to each player in each point in time The actions available to each player in each point in time The pay-off functions







Lecture 10: Game Theory // Preliminaries and dominance	
Introduction - Continued	
Normal or extensive form	
Extensive form Some important remarks	
Some examples	
What's next	
	0 · · 2 · · 2 · 2 · D40
	2. 2 2
We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg	ic situations
	5++2++2+ 2 040
We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg	ic situations
<ul> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> </ul>	
< C +	0 + + 2 + + 2 + + 5 + + 5 + + 5
(8)	<b>び・・と)(を・ を つへひ</b>
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strategoing to behave in st</li></ul>	
We would like to know how people are going to behave in strategoing	
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg</li> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> </ul>	ic situations
We would like to know how people are going to behave in strategoing	ic situations how the
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg</li> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> <li>The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict</li> </ul>	ic situations how the
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg</li> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> <li>The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict</li> </ul>	ic situations how the
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg</li> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> <li>The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict</li> </ul>	ic situations how the
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg</li> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> <li>The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict</li> </ul>	ic situations how the
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg</li> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> <li>The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict</li> </ul>	ic situations how the
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg</li> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> <li>The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict</li> </ul>	ic situations how the
<ul> <li>We would like to know how people are going to behave in strateg</li> <li>This is much more difficult than it seems</li> <li>The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predic individuals will play in a strategic situation or how the game will</li> </ul>	ic situations how the

- $\blacktriangleright$  We would like to know how people are going to behave in strategic situations
- This is much more difficult than it seems
- The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict how the individuals will play in a strategic situation or how the game will develop
- Solution concepts will look for "stable" situations

- > We would like to know how people are going to behave in strategic situations
- This is much more difficult than it seems
- The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict how the individuals will play in a strategic situation or how the game will develop
- Solution concepts will look for "stable" situations
- That is, strategies where no individual has incentives to deviate or to do something different, given what others do.

(D) (B) (S) (S) (S) S (O)

- We would like to know how people are going to behave in strategic situations
- ► This is much more difficult than it seems
- ► The concepts that have been developed do not pretend to predict how the individuals will play in a strategic situation or how the game will develop
- Solution concepts will look for "stable" situations
- That is, strategies where no individual has incentives to deviate or to do something different, given what others do.
- This is a concept equivalent to general equilibrium, where given market prices, everyone is optimizing, markets empty, and therefore no one has incentives to deviate, but nobody told us how we got there ... pause (the Walrasian auctioneer?)

・ロト・(部・・ミン・モ・・モーの)

Lecture 11: Game Theory $//$ Preliminaries and dominance
Introduction - Continued

Static games with complete information

-----

Lecture 11: Game Theory // Preliminaries and dominance

Introduction - Continued

Static games with complete information

Static games with complete information

► Games where all players move simultaneously and only once

#### Static games with complete information

- Games where all players move simultaneously and only once
- If players move sequentially, but can not observe what other people played, it's
  equivalent to a static game

1011001211212

#### Static games with complete information

- Games where all players move simultaneously and only once
- $\blacktriangleright\,$  If players move sequentially, but can not observe what other people played, it's equivalent to a static game
- Only consider games of complete information (all players know the objective functions of their opponents)

E) (B) (E) (E) (E)

### Static games with complete information

- Games where all players move simultaneously and only once
- $\blacktriangleright$  If players move sequentially, but can not observe what other people played, it's equivalent to a static game
- Only consider games of complete information (all players know the objective functions of their opponents)
- These are very restrictive conditions but they will allow us to present very important concepts that will be easy to extend to more complex games

#### Static games with complete information

- Games where all players move simultaneously and only once
- $\blacktriangleright$  If players move sequentially, but can not observe what other people played, it's equivalent to a static game
- Only consider games of complete information (all players know the objective functions of their opponents)
- These are very restrictive conditions but they will allow us to present very important concepts that will be easy to extend to more complex games
- As each player faces one contingency, the strategies are identical to the actions.


#### Lecture 10: Game Theory // Preliminaries and dominance

ntroduction - Continued Normal or extensive form Extensive form Some important remarks Some examples What's next

Static games with complete information Dominance of Strategies

complete information

Dominance
Intuitively if a strategy s <sub>i</sub> always results in a greater utility than s <sub>i</sub> , regardless of the strategy followed by the other players then the strategy s <sub>i</sub> should never be chosen by individual i
1011011211212
Dominance
$s_i$ <b>strictly dominates</b> $s_i'$ if no matter what the opponent does, $s_i$ gives a better payoff to $i$ than $s_i'$ Definition
Let $s_i, s'_i \in \mathbf{I}_{w_i}$ by our strategies. Then we say that $s_i$ strictly dominates $s'_i$ if for all $\underline{s_{-i}} \in S_{-i}$ $u_i(\underline{s_i}, \underline{s_{-i}}) \geq u_i(\underline{s'}, \underline{s_{-i}})$
(8)(8)(2)(2) 2 010
Dominance
strictly dominates <i>s</i> <sub>i</sub> .
(3)、(3)、(2)、(2)、(2)、(3)、(3)、(3)、(3)、(3)、(3)、(3)、(3)、(3)、(3
Dominance ► Intuitively if a strategy s, always results in a greater utility than s,' regardless of
the strategy followed by the other players then the strategy $s_i^i$ should never be chosen by individual $i$
the strategy followed by the other players then the strategy $\mathbf{s}_i^\prime$ should never be chosen by individual $i$
the strategy followed by the other players then the strategy s <sup>i</sup> <sub>i</sub> should never be chosen by individual <i>i</i>
the strategy followed by the other players then the strategy $\mathbf{s}_i^\prime$ should never be chosen by individual $i$



Dominance (iterated)	
Consider this game A 5, 5 0, 10 3, 4	
B         3, 0         2, 2         4, 5	
Player 1 has no strategy that is strictly dominated	
b dominates a for player 2, thus we can eliminate a	
Player 1 would foresee this	(口) (月) (2) (2) 夏 の(0)
Dominance (iterated)	
b         c           A         0, 10         3, 4           B         2, 2         4, 5	
► B now dominates A for player 1	
	<ロト・(費)、(2)、(2)、2) 2 約3(0)
Dominance (iterated)	
b c A 0, 10 3, 4	
B 2, 2 4, 5	
► B now dominates A for player 1	
<ul> <li>Player 2 would foresee this (that player 1 foresees that he will not play B)</li> </ul>	2 will not play a, and thus
······································	
	(日)(四)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)
Dominance (iterated)	
b         c           B         2, 2         4, 5	
▶ Player 2 would play <i>c</i> and player 1 would play <i>B</i>	
	(D) (Ø) (2) (2) 2 990
Dominance (iterated)	
b         c           B         2, 2         4, 5	
▶ Player 2 would play <i>c</i> and player 1 would play <i>B</i>	
• We have reached a solution $(B, c)$	

Dominance (iterated)
<ul> <li>Player 2 would play c and player 1 would play B</li> <li>We have proceed a colution (B, c)</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>We have reached a solution (B, c)</li> <li>This is known as Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS)</li> </ul>
(B)
Dominance (iterated)
b         c           B         2, 2         4, 5
► Player 2 would play <i>c</i> and player 1 would play <i>B</i>
• We have reached a solution $(\mathcal{B}, c)$
This is known as Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS)
► The equilibrium is the set of strategies, not the payoff!
- C + (1) + 2 + 2 - 930
IDSDS
Definition (Solvable by IDSDS) A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)
A game is solvable by Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies if the
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player) IDSDS Two key assumptions:
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)           IDSDS           Two key assumptions:
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player) IDSDS Two key assumptions:
A game is solvable by <b>Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies</b> if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)           IDSDS           Two key assumptions:
A game is solvable by Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)           IDSDS           > Two key assumptions:
A game is solvable by Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)           CONSERVE E ONC           IDSDS           CONSERVE E ONC           IDSDS           CONSERVE E ONC
A game is solvable by Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)           CONSERVE E ONC           IDSDS           CONSERVE E ONC           IDSDS           CONSERVE E ONC
A game is solvable by Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies if the result of the iteration is <u>a single strategy profile</u> (one strategy for each player)           CONSERVE E ONC           IDSDS           CONSERVE E ONC           IDSDS           CONSERVE E ONC

IDSDS
► Two key assumptions:
<ul> <li>1) Nobody plays a strictly dominated strategy (that is, the agents are rational)</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>2) Everyone trusts others are rational (i.e., they do not play strictly dominated</li> </ul>
strategies). That is, agents' rationality is <i>common information</i>
·日··康··朱··朱· 朱 句(
IDSDS
Two key assumptions:
$\blacktriangleright$ 1) Nobody plays a strictly dominated strategy (that is, the agents are rational)
<ul> <li>2) Everyone trusts others are rational (i.e., they do not play strictly dominated strategies). That is, agents' rationality is <i>common information</i></li> </ul>
(D) (Ø) (2) (2) 2 OC
IDSDS
Two key assumptions:
<ul> <li>I No key country from a</li> <li>I) Nobody plays a strictly dominated strategy (that is, the agents are rational)</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>2) Everyone trusts others are rational (i.e., they do not play strictly dominated</li> </ul>
strategies). That is, agents' rationality is common information
Is the order of elimination of the strategies important? No
1011001121121 2 01
IDSDS
► Two key assumptions:
<ul> <li>1) Nobody plays a strictly dominated strategy (that is, the agents are rational)</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>2) Everyone trusts others are rational (i.e., they do not play strictly dominated strategies). That is, agents' rationality is common information</li> </ul>
Is the order of elimination of the strategies important? No
Not all games are solvable by IDSDS
· a · · d · · 2 · · 3 · 2 · d
Battle of the sexes
32
P 0.0 1.2
No strategy is dominated for either player
the states is commend to relie payor