


Lecture 2: General Equilibrium
Mauricio Romero



Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

Cobb-Douglas
Using isoelastics
Perfect substitutes
Perfect complements

Cobb-Douglas

$$u_A(x, y) = x^\alpha y^{1-\alpha}$$


$$u_B(x, y) = x^\beta y^{1-\beta}$$

For graph suppose

$$\alpha = 0.7$$

$$\beta = 0.3$$

$$\omega^A = (1, 1) = (w_x^A, w_y^A)$$

$$\omega^B = (1, 1) = (w_x^B, w_y^B)$$


INTERCAMBIOS VOLUNTARIOS

$$U^A = x^\alpha y^{1-\alpha}$$

Cobb-Douglas

- Indifference curves must be tangent (formalize this later)
- Thus, the MRS must be equalized across the two consumers

$$MRS_{xy}^A = \frac{\frac{\partial U^A}{\partial x}}{\frac{\partial U^A}{\partial y}} = \frac{\alpha x^{\alpha-1} y^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha x^\alpha y^{-\alpha}} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^{1-\alpha}}{x^{1-\alpha}}$$

$$MRS_{xy}^B = \frac{\frac{\partial U^B}{\partial x}}{\frac{\partial U^B}{\partial y}} = \frac{\beta x^{\beta-1} y^{1-\beta}}{1-\beta x^\beta y^{-\beta}} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^{1-\beta}}{x^{1-\beta}}$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$

$$MRS_{xy}^A = \frac{\partial U^A / \partial x}{\partial U^A / \partial y} = \frac{\alpha x^{\alpha-1} y^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha x^\alpha y^{-\alpha}} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^{1-\alpha} (-\alpha)}{x^{\alpha-(\alpha-1)}} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y}{x}$$

Cobb-Douglas

But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x = 2$$


$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y = 2$$

Cobb-Douglas

But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{y^B}{x^B}$$


Cobb-Douglas
But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha y^A}{1 - \alpha x^A} = \frac{\beta (\omega_y - y^A)}{1 - \beta (\omega_x - x^A)}$$

Cobb-Douglas
But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha y^A}{1 - \alpha x^A} = \frac{\beta (\omega_y - y^A)}{1 - \beta (\omega_x - x^A)}$$

(Handwritten notes in red and green ink showing algebraic manipulation and a boxed expression: $(-x^A)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{1}{\omega_x - x^A}$)


Cobb-Douglas
But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha y^A}{1 - \alpha x^A} = \frac{\beta (\omega_y - y^A)}{1 - \beta (\omega_x - x^A)}$$

(Handwritten notes in red and green ink, including a boxed expression: $y^A(x^A)$)



Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

Cobb-Douglas
Using calculus
Perfect substitutes
Perfect complements

Using calculus

Essentially in this exercise we are doing the following:

$$\max_{(x^A, y^A)} u_A(x^A, y^A)$$

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) \geq u_B(x^B, y^B)$$

$$x^B + y^B = \omega_x + \omega_y$$

(Handwritten note: Siempre se utilizan coeficientes)

Theorem

Consider an Edgeworth Box economy and suppose that all consumers have strictly monotone utility functions. Then a feasible allocation (x^A, y^A, x^B, y^B) is Pareto efficient if and only if it solves

$$\max_{(x^A, y^A, x^B, y^B)} u_A(x^A, y^A)$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) \geq u_B$$

$$x^B + x^A \leq \omega_x$$


$$y^B + y^A \leq \omega_y$$

$$Y^A = X^A \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{1}{\omega_x - X^A} (\omega_y - Y^A)$$

$$Y^A = X^A \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \frac{\omega_y}{\omega_x - X^A} - X^A \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{Y^A}{\omega_x - X^A}$$

$$Y^A + X^A \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{Y^A}{\omega_x - X^A} = X^A \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \right) \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y}{\omega_x - X^A}$$

$$Y^A \left(1 + X^A \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{1}{\omega_x - X^A} \right) = X^A \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y}{\omega_x - X^A}$$



$$\mathcal{L} = U_A(x^A, y^A) + \lambda_1 (U_B(x^B, y^B) - \bar{U}_B)$$

$$+ \lambda_2 (\omega_x - x^B - x^A)$$

$$+ \lambda_3 (\omega_y - y^B - y^A)$$

► Very tempting to use Lagrangians, no?

► We need to assume all consumers have quasi-concave, strictly monotone, differentiable utility functions

Then we can solve:

$$\omega_x = x^B + x^A$$

$$\omega_y = y^B + y^A$$

$$x^B = \omega_x - x^A$$

$$y^B = \omega_y - y^A$$

x^B

► Very tempting to use Lagrangeans, no?

► We need to assume all consumers have quasi-concave, strictly monotone, differentiable utility functions

Then we can solve:

$$\mathcal{L} = u_A(x^A, y^A) + \lambda(\omega_x - x^A - x^B - \theta_B) - \mu_B$$



WT 1.1

$$x^B = \omega_x - x^A$$

$$y^B = \omega_y - y^A$$

$$y = U_A(x^A, y^A) + \lambda(U_B(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A) - \bar{U}_B)$$

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial x^A} = \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A} + \lambda \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x^B} (-1) = 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A} = \lambda \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x^B}$$

REGLA DE LA CADENA

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial y^A} = \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A} + \lambda \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y^B} (-1) = 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A} = \lambda \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y^B}$$

Lets take the first order conditions of the above problem.

Beginning with x^A :

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x^A} = \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A}(x^A, y^A) - \lambda \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A) = 0$$

which implies:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A}(x^A, y^A) = \lambda \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)$$

For y^A :

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y^A} = \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A}(x^A, y^A) - \lambda \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A) = 0$$

which implies:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A}(x^A, y^A) = \lambda \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)$$

If (x^A, y^A, x^B, y^B) is Pareto efficient then

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A}(x^A, y^A)}{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A}(x^A, y^A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)}{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A}(x^B, y^B)}{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A}(x^B, y^B)}$$

► In short $MRS_{xy}^A = MRS_{xy}^B$

► This condition is necessary and sufficient

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A}}{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x^B}} = \frac{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A}}{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y^B}}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A}}{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A}} = \frac{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x^B}}{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y^B}}$$

$$MRS_{xy}^A = MRS_{xy}^B$$

Theorem


Suppose that both consumers have utility functions that are quasi-concave and strictly increasing. Suppose that $(x^A, y^A, \omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)$ is an interior feasible allocation. Then $(x^A, y^A, \omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)$ is Pareto efficient if and only if

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A}(x^A, y^A)}{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A}(x^A, y^A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)}{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x^A}(x^B, y^B)}{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y^A}(x^B, y^B)}$$

$$MRS_{xy}^A = MRS_{xy}^B$$

Intuition

Suppose that we are at an allocation where $MRS_{xy}^A = 2 > MRS_{xy}^B = 1$. Can we make both consumers better off?



¿Tiene contenido empírico?

$$MRS_{xy}^A = 2 \quad MRS_{xy}^B = 1 \quad (x^A, y^A, x^B, y^B) = 0$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$(x^A - 1, y^A + 3, x^B + 1, y^B - 1) = F$$

F Pareto Domina A

Intuition

Suppose that we are at an allocation where $MRS_{xy}^A = 2 > MRS_{xy}^B = 1$. Can we make both consumers better off?

► A gives up 1 unit of x in exchange for unit of y.

► B is indifferent since his $MRS_{xy}^B = 1$.

► A receives a unit of x and only needs to give one unit of y (he was willing to give two).

► We have reallocated goods to make A strictly better off without hurting B.

General case (I PERSONAS, L BIENES)

$$\max_{(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L), (x_2^1, \dots, x_2^L)} u(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L) \text{ such that } \begin{cases} u(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L) \geq u^0 \\ x_1^1 + \dots + x_1^L \leq \omega_1 \\ \vdots \\ x_1^1 + \dots + x_1^L \leq \omega_L \end{cases}$$

General case

Theorem
 Suppose that all utility functions are strictly increasing and quasi-concave. Suppose also that $((x_1^1, \dots, x_n^1), \dots, (x_1^m, \dots, x_n^m))$ is a feasible interior allocation. Then $((x_1^1, \dots, x_n^1), \dots, (x_1^m, \dots, x_n^m))$ is Pareto efficient if and only if $((x_1^1, \dots, x_n^1), \dots, (x_1^m, \dots, x_n^m))$ exhausts all resources and for all pairs of agents i, j ,
 $MRS_i^A(x_1^i, \dots, x_n^i) = \dots = MRS_j^B(x_1^j, \dots, x_n^j)$.

$MRS_{1,2}^A = MRS_{1,2}^B$ ✓
 $MRS_{1,3}^A = MRS_{2,3}^B$ ✓
 $MRS_{1,2}^A = MRS_{2,3}^A$ ✗
 $MRS_{1,2}^A = MRS_{2,3}^B$ ✗

► Utility functions must be strictly increasing, quasi-concave and differentiable!


Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

Cobb-Douglas
 Using calculus
 Perfect substitutes
 Perfect complements






Perfect substitutes




Suppose that
 $u_A(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$
 $u_B(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$
 $\omega^A = (1, 1)$
 $\omega^B = (1, 1)$

CURVAS IND.
 $y^A = \bar{U}_A - 2x^A$
 $y^B = \bar{U}_B - x^B$
 $2y^A = \bar{U}_B - (2 - x^A)$
 $4 - \bar{U}_B - 2x^A = y^A$
 ↳ Curva IND de B



INERCAMBIO VOLUNTARIO







→ DONDE ESPERAMOS QUE INTERCAMBIEN

$$U^A = X^A + Y^A$$

$$U^B = X^B + Y^B$$







→ OPTIMOS PARETO






TARDEA

$$U^A = X^A + Y^A$$

$$U^B = ZX^B + Y^B$$



$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, 2y^A)$$



$$w^Y$$


$$4 - Y^A = 2 \left(\frac{4 - X^A}{X^B} \right)$$

$$4 - Y^A = 8 - 2X^A$$









$$-Y^A = 4 - 2X^A$$








$$Y^A = 2X^A - 4$$




→ REPRESENTAN LO MISMO



• PUSHO







► What about $u_1(x,y) = x^2 + y^2$ $u_2(x,y) = x + y$?

► Try it at home!

Recap

- We expect all exchanges to happen on the contract curve (hence its name)
- We expect all voluntary exchanges to be in the orange triangle *Triángulo*
- Can we say more? Not without prices