



Mauricio Romero

Lecture 3: General Equilibrium

Competitive equilibrium

Examples: Cobb-Douglas

Examples: Perfect Complements

Examples: Perfect Substitutes

Lecture 3: General Equilibrium

Competitive equilibrium

Hidden assumptions

- ▶ There is a market for each good
- ▶ Every agent can access the market without any cost
- ▶ There is a unique price for each good and all consumers know this price
- ▶ Each consumer can sell her initial endowment in the market and use the income to buy goods and services
- ▶ Consumers seek to maximize their utility given their budget restriction, independently of what everyone else is doing.
 - ▶ There is no centralized mechanism
 - ▶ People may not know others preferences or endowments
- ▶ There is perfect competition (i.e., everyone is a price taker)
- ▶ The only source of information agents are prices

Competitive equilibrium - Definition

Definition

A pair of an allocation and a price vector, $(x^*, p = (p_1, \dots, p_L))$ is

1. For all consumers $i = 1, 2, \dots, I$, $x^i = (x_1^i, \dots, x_L^i)$ solves the following maximization problem:

such that $p \cdot x^i \leq p \cdot \omega^i = \sum_{l=1}^L p_l \omega_{li}^i$

2. Markets clear: For each commodity $\ell = 1, 2, \dots, L$, the following equation holds:

$$\sum_{i=1}^I x_i^{j*} = \sum_{i=1}^I \omega_i^j.$$

Competitive equilibrium - Properties

Remark

Remark Suppose that at least one consumer has **strictly** monotone preferences. Then if (x^*, p) is a competitive equilibrium, $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_L > 0$.

Remark

Remark Suppose that at least one consumer has **weakly** monotone preferences. Then if (x^*, p) is a competitive equilibrium, there for at least one i , $p_i > 0$.

Remark

If (x^*, p) is a competitive equilibrium, then (x^*, cp) for $c \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is also a competitive equilibrium.

Competitive equilibrium - Walras' Law

Theorem (Walras' Law)

Suppose that consumer i has weakly monotone preferences and that $\bar{x}^i \in x^{i*}(p)$. Then

$$\rho \cdot x^j = \sum_{i=1}^L p_i x_i^j = \sum_{i=1}^L p_i \omega_i^j = \rho \cdot \omega^j.$$

Theorem (Walras' Law - II)

Suppose that utility functions are **weakly monotonic**. Suppose that $p = (p_1, \dots, p_L)$ is such that $p_L > 0$. Take any (x^*, p) in which Condition 1 holds for each consumer $i = 1, 2, \dots, I$ and markets clear for all commodities $l = 1, 2, \dots, L - 1$. Then the market clearing condition will hold for commodity L as well.

Walras' Law - proof

- ▶ For each consumer i , we must

For each consumer i , we must

$$C_{ASIO} = \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_{\ell} x_{\ell}^{i*} = \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_{\ell} \omega_{\ell}^i = \text{Income}$$

Walras' Law - proof

- For each consumer i , we must

$$\sum_{j=1}^J p_j x_i^j = \sum_{j=1}^J p_j \omega_i^j$$
- If we sum the above across all i consumers, then we get:

$$\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^J p_j x_i^j = \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^J p_j \omega_i^j$$

Walras' Law - proof

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- Re-arranging:

$$\sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I x_i^j = \sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I \omega_i^j$$

Walras' Law - proof

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- Re-arranging:

$$\sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I x_i^j = \sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I \omega_i^j$$
- Re-arranging:

$$\sum_{j=1}^J p_j \left(\sum_{i=1}^I x_i^j - \sum_{i=1}^I \omega_i^j \right) = 0$$

Handwritten notes:
 $\sum_{i=1}^I p_i \sum_{j=1}^J x_i^j = \sum_{i=1}^I p_i \sum_{j=1}^J \omega_i^j$
 $\sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I x_i^j = \sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I \omega_i^j$

Walras' Law - proof

- $$\sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I (x_i^j - \omega_i^j) = 0$$

Walras' Law - proof

- $$\sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I (x_i^j - \omega_i^j) = 0$$
- $$p_i \sum_{j=1}^J (x_i^j - \omega_i^j) = 0$$

Handwritten notes:
 $\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^I x_i^j - \omega_i^j = 0$
 $0 \in \{1, \dots, L-1\}$

Walras' Law - proof

- $$\sum_{j=1}^J p_j \sum_{i=1}^I (x_i^j - \omega_i^j) = 0$$
- $$p_i \sum_{j=1}^J (x_i^j - \omega_i^j) = 0$$
- $$\sum_{j=1}^J p_j (x_i^j - \omega_i^j) = 0$$

Handwritten notes:
 \rightarrow MERCADO EN EQ.

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Cobb-Douglas

Suppose

$u_i(x, y) = x^\alpha y^{1-\alpha}$
 $\omega_i(x, y) = x^\beta y^{1-\beta}$
 $\alpha = 0.5$
 $\beta = 0.5$
 $\omega^A = (1.5, 0.5)$
 $\omega^B = (0.5, 1.5)$

Cobb-Douglas

Each individual solves

Handwritten notes:

- $(x_i^j, y_i^j; p_x^j, p_y^j) \in \arg \max_{x_i^j, y_i^j} u_i(x_i^j, y_i^j)$
 s.t.
 $x_i p_x^j + y_i p_y^j \leq \omega_i^j p_x^j + \omega_i^j p_y^j$

1) $(x_i^j, y_i^j) = \arg \max_{x_i^j, y_i^j} x_i^j y_i^j$
 s.t.
 $x_i p_x^j + y_i p_y^j \leq \omega_i^j p_x^j + \omega_i^j p_y^j$

2) $x_A^j + x_B^j = Z = \omega_x^A + \omega_x^B$
 $y_A^j + y_B^j = Z = \omega_y^A + \omega_y^B$

$$\omega^0 = (0.5, 1.5)$$

Cobb-Douglas

Each individual solves

$$\max_{x_i, y_i} \sqrt{x_i y_i}$$

s.t.

$$p_x x_i + p_y y_i \leq p_x w_i^x + p_y w_i^y$$

Cobb-Douglas

Each individual solves

$$\max_{x_i, y_i} \sqrt{x_i y_i}$$

s.t.

$$p_x x_i + p_y y_i \leq p_x w_i^x + p_y w_i^y$$

We can set up a Lagrangian:

$$\mathcal{L} = \sqrt{x_i y_i} + \lambda (p_x w_i^x + p_y w_i^y - p_x x_i - p_y y_i)$$

Cobb-Douglas

Each individual solves

$$\max_{x_i, y_i} \sqrt{x_i y_i}$$

s.t.

$$p_x x_i + p_y y_i \leq p_x w_i^x + p_y w_i^y$$

We can set up a Lagrangian:

$$\mathcal{L} = \sqrt{x_i y_i} + \lambda (p_x w_i^x + p_y w_i^y - p_x x_i - p_y y_i)$$

The FOC are:

$$\frac{1}{2} \frac{y_i}{x_i} = \lambda p_x$$

$$\frac{1}{2} \frac{x_i}{y_i} = \lambda p_y$$

Cobb-Douglas

Thus,

$$\frac{y_i}{x_i} = \frac{p_y}{p_x}$$

$$y_i = x_i \frac{p_y}{p_x}$$

Cobb-Douglas

Thus,

$$\frac{y_i}{x_i} = \frac{p_y}{p_x}$$

$$y_i = x_i \frac{p_y}{p_x}$$

We haven't used the budget restriction!

Cobb-Douglas

Thus,

$$\frac{y_i}{x_i} = \frac{p_y}{p_x}$$

$$y_i = x_i \frac{p_y}{p_x}$$

We haven't used the budget restriction!

$$p_x x_i + p_y y_i = p_x w_i^x + p_y w_i^y$$

$$p_x x_i + p_y x_i \frac{p_y}{p_x} = p_x w_i^x + p_y w_i^y$$

$$x_i = \frac{w_i^x p_x + w_i^y p_y}{2 p_x}$$

$$y_i = \frac{w_i^x p_y + w_i^y p_x}{2 p_y}$$

Cobb-Douglas

$$x^A = \frac{1.5 p_x + 0.5 p_y}{2 p_x}$$

$$y^A = \frac{1.5 p_y + 0.5 p_x}{2 p_y}$$

$$x^B = \frac{0.5 p_x + 1.5 p_y}{2 p_x}$$

$$y^B = \frac{0.5 p_y + 1.5 p_x}{2 p_y}$$

Now we can use condition 2 (market clear)

Cobb-Douglas

$$x^A = \frac{1.5 p_x + 0.5 p_y}{2 p_x}$$

$$y^A = \frac{1.5 p_y + 0.5 p_x}{2 p_y}$$

$$x^B = \frac{0.5 p_x + 1.5 p_y}{2 p_x}$$

$$y^B = \frac{0.5 p_y + 1.5 p_x}{2 p_y}$$

Now we can use condition 2 (market clear)

$$x^A + x^B = 2$$

$$y^A + y^B = 2$$

$$x_A^* + x_B^* = Z = w_A^x + w_B^x$$

$$y_A^* + y_B^* = Z = w_A^y + w_B^y$$

$$y_i = x_i^{0.5} y_i^{0.5} + \lambda (w_i^x p_x + w_i^y p_y - x_i p_x - y_i p_y)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_i} = 0.5 x_i^{-0.5} y_i^{0.5} - \lambda p_x = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y_i} = 0.5 x_i^{0.5} y_i^{-0.5} - \lambda p_y = 0$$

$$\frac{0.5 x_i^{-0.5} y_i^{0.5}}{0.5 x_i^{0.5} y_i^{-0.5}} = \frac{p_x}{p_y}$$

$$\frac{y_i}{x_i} = \frac{p_x}{p_y} \Rightarrow y_i = \frac{p_x \cdot x_i}{p_y}$$

$$w_A^x p_x + w_B^x p_x = x_A p_x + y_A p_y$$

$$w_A^x p_x + w_B^x p_x = x_A p_x + \frac{p_x \cdot x_A \cdot p_x}{p_y}$$

$$w_A^x p_x + w_B^x p_x = Z p_x$$

$$\frac{w_A^x p_x + w_B^x p_x}{Z p_x} = \frac{x_A p_x}{Z p_x}$$

PP method

$$\frac{w_A^x p_x + w_B^x p_x}{Z p_x} = \frac{y_A p_y}{Z p_y}$$

② method

$$x_A^* + x_B^* = Z$$

$$\frac{1.5 p_x + 0.5 p_y}{2 p_x} + \frac{0.5 p_x + 1.5 p_y}{2 p_x} = Z$$

$$\frac{Z p_x + Z p_y}{2 p_x} = Z$$

$$1 + \frac{p_y}{p_x} = Z$$

$$\frac{p_y}{p_x} = 1$$

$$P^* = (1, 1)$$

$$P^* = (2, 2)$$

$$P^* = (1/2, 1/2)$$

$$x_e^A = \frac{1.5 \cdot 1 + 0.5 \cdot 1}{2} = 1$$

$$x_e^B = \frac{0.5 \cdot 1 + 1.5 \cdot 1}{2} = 1$$

$$y_e^A = 1$$

$$y_e^B = 1$$


Cobb-Douglas

$$\frac{1.5p_x + 0.5p_y}{2p_x} + \frac{0.5p_x + 1.5p_y}{2p_y} = 2$$
$$\frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$$

Cobb-Douglas

$$\frac{1.5p_x + 0.5p_y}{2p_x} + \frac{0.5p_x + 1.5p_y}{2p_y} = 2$$
$$\frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$$
$$x^A = x^B = y^A = y^B = 1$$

Cobb-Douglas



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Competitive equilibrium

Examples: Cobb-Douglas

Examples: Perfect Complements

Examples: Perfect Substitutes

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
Examples: Perfect Complements

Examples: Perfect Substitutes

Perfect complements

Suppose that

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, 2y^A)$$
$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = \min(2x^B, y^B)$$
$$\omega^A = (3, 1)$$
$$\omega^B = (1, 3)$$



Perfect complements

At a given price vector, consumer A can buy any combination (x^A, y^A) such that:

$$p_x w_x^A + p_y w_y^A \geq p_x x^A + p_y y^A$$

$$p_x w_x + p_y w_y - p_x x \geq y$$

$$\left(\frac{p_x w_x + p_y w_y}{p_y} - \frac{p_x}{p_y} \right) x \geq y$$

Perfect complements

At a given price vector, consumer A can buy any combination (x^A, y^A) such that:

$$p_x w_x^A + p_y w_y^A \geq p_x x^A + p_y y^A$$

or equivalently

$$y^A \leq \frac{p_x w_x^A + p_y w_y^A}{p_y} - \frac{p_x}{p_y} x^A$$

Perfect complements

At a given price vector, consumer A can buy any combination (x^A, y^A) such that:

$$p_x w_x^A + p_y w_y^A \geq p_x x^A + p_y y^A$$

or equivalently

$$y^A \leq \frac{p_x w_x^A + p_y w_y^A}{p_y} - \frac{p_x}{p_y} x^A$$

How does this look in the Edgeworth box?

Navigation icons

If $\frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$ Then, we will have the following restriction:

$$y^A \leq \frac{p_x}{p_y} (w_x^A - x^A) + w_y^A$$

Navigation icons

If $\frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$ Then, we will have the following restriction:

$$y^A \leq \frac{p_x}{p_y} (w_x^A - x^A) + w_y^A$$

Thus, replacing the values of w_x^A and w_y^A , we have:

$$y^A \leq \frac{p_x}{p_y} (3 - x^A) + 1$$

Navigation icons

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Thus, replacing the values of w_x^A and w_y^A , we have:


$$y^A \leq \frac{p_x}{p_y} (3 - x^A) + 1$$

Note that, for the case $\frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$, we have the following restriction:

$$y^A \leq 4 - x^A$$


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$\frac{p_x}{p_y} < 1$



Navigation icons


$\frac{p_x}{p_y} < 1$



A can buy what's below the orange line, B what is above

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
$\frac{p_x}{p_y} < 1$



Excess demand of Y and excess supply of X

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$\frac{p_x}{p_y} > 1$




EXCESS OFERTA



EXCESO DEMANDA

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



$\frac{p_x}{p_y} > 1$



Navigation icons



What about zero prices?



To sum up...

- There are multiple equilibria
- There are three price vectors associated with these equilibria
- One price vector has a unique resource allocation associated with it
- Two price vectors ($p_X = 0$ and $p_Y = 0$) have infinitely resource allocations associated with them

Perfect complements

Try at home:

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, y^A)$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = \min(x^B, y^B)$$

$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$

$$\omega^B = (3, 1)$$

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Perfect Substitutes

$$u(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$$

$$u(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$$

$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$

$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

Perfect Substitutes

$$u(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$$

$$u(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$$

$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$

$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

$p_x > 0$ and $p_y > 0$, why?

Perfect Substitutes

$$u(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$$

$$u(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$$


$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$

$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$

$p_x > 0$ and $p_y > 0$, why? hence, normalize $p_x = 1$


Perfect Substitutes

Preferences of person A:



Perfect Substitutes

Preferences of person B:



Perfect Substitutes

Algebraic solution

$$\max_{x^A, y^A} 2x^A + y^A$$

subject to:

$$I = x^A + p_y y^A$$

$$y^A \geq 0$$

$$x^A \geq 0$$

Perfect Substitutes

Algebraic solution

$$\max_{x^A, y^A} 2x^A + y^A$$

subject to:


$$I = x^A + p_y y^A$$

$$y^A \geq 0$$

$$x^A \geq 0$$

From the budget constraint we can obtain $y^A = \frac{I - x^A}{p_y}$, and adding the condition $y^A \geq 0$, we can conclude that $x^A \in [0, I]$.

Perfect Substitutes



$$X^B = \begin{cases} 0 & \frac{P_x}{P_y} > 1 \\ [0, \frac{I}{P_x}] & \frac{P_x}{P_y} = 1 \\ \frac{I}{P_x} & \frac{P_x}{P_y} < 1 \end{cases}$$

$$Y^B = \begin{cases} \frac{I}{P_y} & \frac{P_x}{P_y} > 1 \\ [0, \frac{I}{P_y}] & \frac{P_x}{P_y} = 1 \\ 0 & \frac{P_x}{P_y} < 1 \end{cases}$$



CASO 1

$$\frac{P_x}{P_y} < 1$$

PCDO X

$$\frac{I_B}{P_x} + \frac{I_A}{P_x} = Z$$

IN APPENDIX

From the budget constraint we can obtain $y^A = \frac{p_x x^A}{p_y}$, and adding the condition $y^A \geq 0$, we can conclude that $x^A \in [0, \bar{x}]$.

Perfect Substitutes

Introducing y^A into the original maximization problem:



$$\max (2 - \frac{1}{p_y})x^A + \frac{1}{p_y} \quad s.t. x^A \in [0, \bar{x}]$$

Which is a maximization of a straight line with slope $(2 - \frac{1}{p_y})$ over an interval.

Perfect Substitutes

The demand for goods of individual A is

$$x^A = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p_y < 0.5 \\ [0, \bar{x}] & \text{if } p_y = 0.5 \\ \bar{x} & \text{if } p_y > 0.5 \end{cases}$$

$$y^A = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{p_y} & \text{if } p_y < 0.5 \\ [0, \frac{1}{p_y}] & \text{if } p_y = 0.5 \\ 0 & \text{if } p_y > 0.5 \end{cases}$$


Perfect Substitutes

Algebraic solution
For person B the solution is analogous, but we have the following maximization problem: Introducing y^B into the original maximization problem:



$$\max (1 - \frac{1}{p_y})x^B + \frac{1}{p_y} \quad s.t. x^B \in [0, \bar{x}]$$

Which is a maximization of a straight line with slope $(1 - \frac{1}{p_y})$ over an interval.

Perfect Substitutes

The demand for goods of individual B is

$$x^B = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p_y < 1 \\ [0, \bar{x}] & \text{if } p_y = 1 \\ \bar{x} & \text{if } p_y > 1 \end{cases}$$

$$y^B = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{p_y} & \text{if } p_y < 1 \\ [0, \frac{1}{p_y}] & \text{if } p_y = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } p_y > 1 \end{cases}$$


Perfect Substitutes

When is the market for good X balanced (how about good Y)?

X^A X^B
DD AGREGADA

$$\frac{p_x + p_y}{p_x} + \frac{p_x + p_y}{p_x}$$

$$\frac{2p_x + 2p_y}{p_x}$$

$$2 + \frac{2p_y}{p_x} \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

~~X~~ NO ES EQ.

CASO 2

$$p_x = p_y \Rightarrow \frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$$

$$\frac{1^A}{p_x} + X_B^A \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

$$[0, \frac{1^B}{p_x}]$$

$$\frac{p_x + p_y}{p_x} + X_B^A \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

$$2 + X_B^A \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

ES EQ.
SI $X_B^A = 0$

EQ!

$$\frac{p_x}{p_y} = 1$$

$$X^A = 2 \quad Y^A = 0$$

$$X^B = 0 \quad Y^B = 2$$

CASO 3

$$1 < \frac{P_X}{P_Y} < 2 \Rightarrow \frac{1}{2} < \frac{P_Y}{P_X} < 1$$

$$\frac{I^A}{P_X} + 0 \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

↑
 X^B

$$\frac{P_X + P_Y}{P_X} \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

$$1 + \frac{P_Y}{P_X} \stackrel{?}{=} 2 \quad \text{NO ES EQ.}$$

CASO 4

$$\frac{P_X}{P_Y} = 2$$

$$X^A + 0 \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

0

$$\left[0, \frac{I^A}{P_X}\right]$$

$$\frac{P_X + P_Y}{P_X} \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

$$1 + \frac{P_Y}{P_X} \stackrel{?}{=} 2$$

$$1 < \frac{P_X}{P_Y} < 2 \quad \text{NO ES EQ.}$$

Perfect Substitutes
When is the market for good X balanced (how about good Y)?

- Try $p_Y < 0.5$
- $X^A = 0$ and $X^B = 0$
- Try $p_Y = 0.5$
- $X^A = [0, 1]$ and $X^B = 0$
- Can't be an equilibrium since $I = 1.5$ when $p_Y = 0.5$, thus $X^A + X^B < 2$
- Try $0.5 < p_Y < 1$
- $X^A = I$ and $X^B = 0$
- Can't be an equilibrium since $I = 1 + p_Y$, thus $X^A + X^B < 2$
- Try $p_Y = 1$
- $X^A = I = 2$ and $X^B = [0, 2]$
- One possible equilibrium ($X^A = 2, X^B = 0, Y^A = 0, Y^B = 2$)
- Try $p_Y > 1$

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- $X^A = I = 2$ and $X^B = [0, 2]$
- One possible equilibrium ($X^A = 2, X^B = 0, Y^A = 0, Y^B = 2$)
- Try $p_Y > 1$
- $X^A = I$ and $X^B = I$
- Can't be an equilibrium since $I = 1 + p_Y$, thus $X^A + X^B = 2 + 2p_Y > 2$

1.5 ~~≠~~ 2 NO ES EQ.

CASO 5

$$\frac{P_X}{P_Y} > 2$$

DD AGREGADA = 0