

## Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

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### Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

A few things I forgot to say about economies with production

Robinson Crusoe

Two firms

General Economies with Many Consumers and Production

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# Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

A few things I forgot to say about economies with production

Robinson Crusoe

General Economies with Many Consumers and Production

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- ▶ With production, Edgeworth box illustrations are no longer helpful
- $\,\blacktriangleright\,$  Depending on the production plan, the size of the box can change
- ▶ Instead we work with what is called a production possibilities frontier

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Lecture 6: General Equilibrium	
Robinson Crusoe	
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▶ Imagine the problem of Robinson Crusoe, living alone in an island. He is the only	
producer and the only consumer	
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Suppose that the consumer (Robinson) has a utility function:	
u(L,x), where x are coconuts. There is one firm (Robinson) that can convert labor to coconuts:	
$f(L_x)$ The endowment is $(0,\bar{L})$	
The Gradients is (4, 2)	
- 17 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18	
What is the Pareto optimal allocation in this economy?	
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	PRODUCCION
	PRODUCCION
What is the Pareto optimal allocation in this economy? $\max u(L,x)$ such that $x \leq f(L_x)$ FACT BE	
$\max u(L,x)$ such that $x \le f(L_x)$ FACT $C$	
Lo (I= Lx+L	
Lnx=1	(I-L)
211 - 48 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -	The state of the s
	LD (ansunto
Or equivalently	POSIBILIDADES
$\max u(L,f(ar{L}-L))$	U(x,L) PRODUCCIÓN
	L ADTITO
	5 OPTIMO PARCETO
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Or equivalently

 $\max a(L,f(\bar{L}-L))$ 

We can solve this either using calculus or graphically



THIT = TMS

MAX U(x,L) s.a x= (I-L)

MAX U(1x(I-L), L)

Using calculus...

$$\frac{\partial V(4x(\bar{\iota}-L),L)}{\partial L} = \frac{\partial V}{\partial x} \cdot \frac{\partial 4x}{\partial L} \cdot (-1) + \frac{\partial V}{\partial L} = 0$$

Using calculus... This is the order condition:

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial L}(L, f(\bar{L}-L)) - \frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(L, f(\bar{L}-L)))f'(\bar{L}-L) = 0$$

This =  $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x} = \frac{\partial Ax}{\partial Lx} = ThiT$ 

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Using calculus... This is the order condition:

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$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial L}(L, f(\tilde{L} - L)) = \frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(L, f(\tilde{L} - L)))f'(\tilde{L} - L)$$

$$\frac{\frac{\partial u}{\partial L}(L, f(\overline{L}-L))}{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(L, f(\overline{L}-L)))} = f'(\overline{L}-L)$$

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$$f'(\overline{L} - L) = \frac{\frac{\partial u}{\partial L}(L, f(\overline{L} - L))}{\frac{\partial u}{\partial L}(L, f(\overline{L} - L))} = MRS_{L,x}$$

▶ If Robinson gives up 1 unit of consumption in L,  $f'(\bar{L}-L)$  describes how much more in terms of x Robinson will be able to consume

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- If Robinson gives up 1 unit of consumption in L,  $\ell'(\tilde{L}-L)$  describes how much more in terms of x Robinson will be able to consume
- ightharpoonup This is what is called a Marginal Rate of Transformation of good L to x

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$$f'(\overline{L}-L) = \frac{\frac{\partial u}{\partial L}(L, f(\overline{L}-L))}{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(L, f(\overline{L}-L))} = MRS_{L,x}$$

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$$\begin{split} f'(\bar{L}-L) &= \frac{\frac{\partial u}{\partial L}(L,f(\bar{L}-L))}{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(L,f(\bar{L}-L))} = MRS_{L,x} \\ MRT_{L,x} &= MRS_{L,x}. \end{split}$$

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We can solve the above graphically.

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$$\{(L,x): x \leq f(L_X), L_X + L \leq \tilde{L}\}$$

describes the possible sets of bundles that Robinson could possibly consume in this economy.

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This is called the production possibilities set (PPS)

We can solve the above graphically. The set

$$\{(L,x):x\leq f(L_X),L_x+L\leq \tilde{L}\}$$

describes the possible sets of bundles that Robinson could possibly consume in this economy.
This is called the **production possibilities set** (PPS)
The boundary of the PPS is the**production possibilities frontier** (PPF)

The frontier is basically described by the curve:

 $x = f(L_x), L_x \in [0, \overline{L}].$ 

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$$x = f(L_x), L_x \in [0, \overline{L}].$$

The maximization problem for finding Pareto efficient allocations simply amounts to maximizing the utility of Robinson subject to being inside this constraint set.

### Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

# Robinson Crusoe Econ 1 Intuition

lacktriangle Recall that at a Pareto optimum, we found that we must have  $MRT_{L,x} = MRS_{L,x}$ 

Suppose one is at an allocation where  $MRT_{L,x}=2>MRS_{L,x}=1$ 

Such an allocation cannot be a Pareto efficient allocation. Why?



- ▶ Suppose one is at an allocation where  $MRT_{L,x} = 2 > MRS_{L,x} = 1$
- ► Such an allocation cannot be a Pareto efficient allocation. Why?
- ▶ One could potentially reorganize production to get an even better outcome for the

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Two firms

General Economies with Many Consumers and Production

### Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

### Two firms

- ► The consumer has a utility function u(x, y)
- ► The consumer is endowed with 0 units of both x and y but x and y can be produced from labor and capital
- lacktriangle She is endowed with K units of capital and L units of labor
- There are two firms each of which produces a commodity x and y.
- Firm x produces x according to a production function  $f_x$  and firm y produces y according to a production function  $f_y$ :

 $f_x(\ell_x, k_x), f_y(\ell_y, k_y).$ 

To solve for the Pareto efficient allocation we solve:

 $\max u(x,y) \text{ such that } x \leq f_x(\ell_x,k_x), y \leq f_y(\ell_y,k_y), \\ L \geq \ell_x + \ell_y, K \geq k_x + k_y.$ 

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## Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

# Graphical Approach

We look at the production possibilities set (PPS) of this economy:

$$\{(x,y): x \leq f_x(\ell_x,k_x), y \leq f_y(\ell_y,k_y), \ell_x + \ell_y \leq L, k_x + k_y \leq K\}.$$

Then given the PPS, we want to maximize the utility of the agent subject to being inside the PPS. If we want to maximize the utility of the agent, we need:

- 1. The chosen  $(x^*, y^*)$  must be on the PPF.
- 2. The indifference curve of the consumer must be tangent to the PPF at  $(x^*, y^*)$ .



### Two firms

### Calculus Approach I

To find the PPF: given that x units of commodity x must be produced, what is the maximum amount of y's that can be produced?

To find the PPF: given that x units of commodity x must be produced, what is the maximum amount of y's that can be produced? Thus  $PPF(x) = \max_{\ell_x, k_y} f_{\nu_x}(\ell_p, k_y) \text{ such that } \overline{x} = \ell_x(\overline{L} - \ell_y, \overline{K} - k_y).$ 

$$PF(x) = \lim_{k \to \infty} s_{\ell}(l_{p_{k}}, k_{p_{k}}) \text{ such that } \overline{x} = f_{\ell}(\overline{l} - l_{p_{k}}, \overline{k} - k_{p_{k}}).$$

$$\downarrow : f_{p_{\ell}}(l_{p_{k}}, k_{p_{k}}) + \lambda \left(f_{x}(\overline{l} - l_{p_{k}}, k_{p_{k}}) - \overline{x}\right)$$

$$\frac{\partial J}{\partial l_{p_{k}}} = \frac{2f_{p_{k}}}{\partial l_{p_{k}}} + \lambda \frac{2f_{x_{k}}}{l_{x_{k}}}(-1) = 0$$

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Setting up the Lagrangian we get:

$$\max_{\ell_y, k_y} f_y(\ell_y, k_y) + \lambda (f_x(L - \ell_y, K - k_y) - x))$$

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The first order conditions give us:

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial f_y}{\partial \ell} (\ell_y^*, k_y^*) - \lambda \frac{\partial f_x}{\partial \ell} (L - \ell_y^*, K - k_y^*) &= 0 \\ \frac{\partial f_y}{\partial k} (\ell_y^*, k_y^*) - \lambda \frac{\partial f_x}{\partial k} (L - \ell_y^*, K - k_y^*) &= 0 \end{split}$$

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$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial f_y}{\partial \ell}(\ell_y^*,k_y^*) &= \lambda \frac{\partial f_x}{\partial \ell}(L-\ell_y^*,K-k_y^*) \\ \frac{\partial f_y}{\partial k}(\ell_y^*,k_y^*) &= \lambda \frac{\partial f_x}{\partial k}(L-\ell_y^*,K-k_y^*) \end{split}$$

Thus at the optimum, we have:

$$TRS_{\ell,k}^{y} = \frac{\frac{\partial f_{y}}{\partial t}(\ell_{y}^{y},k_{y}^{y})}{\frac{\partial f_{y}}{\partial t}(\ell_{y}^{y},k_{y}^{y})} = \frac{\frac{\partial f_{z}}{\partial t}(L-\ell_{y}^{y},K-k_{y}^{y})}{\frac{\partial f_{z}}{\partial t}(L-\ell_{y}^{y},K-k_{y}^{y})} = TRS_{\ell,k}^{y}.$$

- ▶ To actually solve for the optimal  $x^*$  and  $y^*$  we plug this back into the constraint  $x = f_s(L \ell_y^*, K k_y^*)$
- ▶ Therefore at a Pareto optimum we must have  $TRS_{\ell,k}^{\times} = TRS_{\ell,k}^{\times}$  equalized
- You should be able to come up with the Econ 1 intuition for this as we have done previously

- ► A Pareto optimum also requires bullet point 2 above (i.e., indifference curve is tangent to PPF)
- ► The slope of the indifference curve is given b


$$-MRS_{x,y} = -\frac{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(x^*, y^*)}{\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}(x^*, y^*)}.$$

What is the slope of the PPF?

- ► Note that mathematically, this is given by PPF'(x)
  ► How do we calculate that?

$$PPF(\overline{x}) = \max_{\ell_y, k_y} f_y(\ell_y, k_y) + \lambda (f_x(L - \ell_y, K - k_y) - \overline{x}))$$

▶ By the envelope theorem



- Note that mathematically, this is given by PPF'(x)
  How do we calculate that?

$$PPF(x) = \max_{\ell_y, k_y} f_y(\ell_y, k_y) + \lambda (f_x(L - \ell_y, K - k_y) - x))$$

By the envelope theorem

$$\begin{split} PPF'(x) &= & -\lambda \\ &= & -\frac{\frac{\partial f_{\epsilon}}{\partial t}(\xi_{\gamma}, k_{\gamma}^{\alpha})}{\frac{\partial f_{\epsilon}}{\partial t}(\xi_{\gamma}, k_{\gamma}^{\alpha})} \\ &= & -\frac{\frac{\partial f_{\epsilon}}{\partial t}(\xi_{\gamma}, k_{\gamma}^{\alpha})}{\frac{\partial f_{\epsilon}}{\partial t}(\xi_{\gamma}, k_{\gamma}^{\alpha})} \\ &= & -\frac{\partial f_{\epsilon}}{\partial t}(\xi_{\gamma}^{\alpha}, k_{\gamma}^{\alpha}) \\ &= & -MRT_{x,y} \end{split}$$

► Therefore, at a Pareto optimum

$$MRT_{x,y} = MRS_{x,y}$$

Thus we have learned the following: A Pareto efficient allocation is characterized by

- 1.  $(x^*, y^*)$  is on the PPF:  $TRS_{\ell,k}^x = TRS_{\ell,k}^y$ .
- 2. At  $(x^*, y^*)$  the indifference curve is tangent to the PPF:  $MRS_{x,y} = MRT_{x,y}$ .

### Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

Two firms

Calculus Approach II

We solve directly the original maximization problem.


$$\begin{split} \max u(x,y) & \text{ such that } x \leq \mathit{f}_x(\ell_x,k_x), y \leq \mathit{f}_y(\ell_y,k_y), \\ & L \geq \ell_x + \ell_y, K \geq k_x + k_y. \end{split}$$

We can simplify the problem:

$$\max_{\ell_x, k_x} u(f_x(\ell_x, k_x), f_y(L - \ell_x, K - k_x))$$

Then the first order conditions give us:

$$\begin{split} \frac{\mathrm{d} s}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( b_1(t_s^n, k_s^n), b_2(1-t_s^n, K-k_s^n) \right) \frac{\mathrm{d} b_2}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( t_s^n, k_s^n \right) &= \frac{\mathrm{d} s}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( b_1(t_s^n, k_s^n), b_2(1-t_s^n, K-k_s^n) \right) \frac{\mathrm{d} b_2}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( 1-t_s^n, K-k_s^n \right) = 0, \\ \frac{\mathrm{d} s}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( b_1(t_s^n, k_s^n), b_2(1-t_s^n, K-k_s^n) \right) \frac{\mathrm{d} b_2}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( t_s^n, k_s^n \right) &= \frac{\mathrm{d} s}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( b_1(t_s^n, k_s^n), b_2(1-t_s^n, K-k_s^n) \right) \frac{\mathrm{d} b_2}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( 1-t_s^n, K-k_s^n \right) \frac{\mathrm{d} s}{\mathrm{d} s} \left( 1-t_s^n, K-k_s^n \right) &= 0. \end{split}$$



We obtain:

$$TRS_{\ell,k}^x = TRS_{\ell,k}^y$$
,  
 $MRS_{x,y} = MRT_{x,y}$ ,

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### Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

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Econ I Intuition

Two firms

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Salabor the Maximization Problem

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Suppose that the utility function are given by:

 $u(x,y) = \sqrt{xy}$ 

and suppose that the production functions are given by:

 $f_x(\ell_x, k_x) = \sqrt{\ell_x k_x}, f_y(\ell_y, k_y) = \sqrt{\ell_y k_y}.$ 

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Then Pareto efficiency involves solving the following maximization problem

max 
$$\sqrt{xy}$$
 such that  $x = f_x(\ell_x, k_x), y = f_y = f_y(\ell_y, k_y)$ .

Profile

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Approach 1: First lets characterize the PPF.

 $PPF(x) = \frac{\max_{k} f_{k}(L - L_{x}, K - k_{x})}{\max_{k} f_{k}(L - L_{x})^{1/2} (k - k_{x})^{1/2}} \leq a \frac{L_{k} k_{x} + L_{k}}{L_{k} k_{x}^{1/2} (k - k_{x})^{1/2}} = 0$   $\frac{3d}{3Lx} = \frac{1}{2} (L - L_{x})^{1/2} (k - k_{x})^{1/2} - (\frac{1}{2} L_{k}^{1/2} k_{x}^{1/2}) = 0$   $\frac{3d}{3Lx} = \frac{1}{2} (L - L_{x})^{1/2} (k - k_{x})^{-1/2} (-1) - \lambda (\frac{1}{2} L_{k}^{1/2} k_{x}^{1/2}) = 0$   $\frac{3d}{3Lx} = \frac{1}{2} (L - L_{x})^{1/2} (k - k_{x})^{-1/2} (-1) - \lambda (\frac{1}{2} L_{k}^{1/2} k_{x}^{1/2}) = 0$ 

 $= D \frac{(K - kx)}{1 - lx} = \frac{kx}{lx}$ 

Klx-txtx= Kx L= Ktx

By the first order condition, we need

$$\frac{k_x^*}{\ell_x^*} = \frac{\frac{\partial \ell_x}{\partial \ell}(\ell_x^*, k_x^*)}{\frac{\partial \ell_x}{\partial \ell}(\ell_x^*, k_x^*)} = \frac{\frac{\partial \ell_x}{\partial \ell}(L - \ell_x^*, K - k_x^*)}{\frac{\partial \ell_x}{\partial \ell}(L - \ell_x^*, K - k_x^*)} = \frac{K - k_x^*}{L - \ell_x^*} \Longrightarrow k_x^* = \frac{K}{L} \ell_x^*$$

Plug this back into the constraint

$$f_x(\ell_x^*, k_x^*) = x \Longrightarrow \sqrt{\ell_x k_x} = x \Longrightarrow \ell_x^* = \sqrt{\frac{L}{\kappa}} x.$$

Therefore

$$f_{p}(L - \ell_{x}, K - k_{x}) = y$$

$$\sqrt{\left(L - \sqrt{\frac{L}{K}}x\right)\left(K - \sqrt{\frac{K}{L}}x\right)} = y$$

$$PPF(x) = \left(\sqrt{KL} - x\right)$$

The Pareto efficient allocation is given by:

$$\left(x^* = y^* = \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{KL}, \ell_x^* = \ell_y^* = \frac{1}{2}L, k_x^* = k_y^* = \frac{1}{2}K\right).$$

Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

A few things I forgot to say about economies with production

Robinson Crusoe


Two firms

General Economies with Many Consumers and Production

KLx-Kxtx= Kx L-Kxtx

Kx (L) /2 Ex = X


 $y'' = (L - L_x)^{1/2} (K - k_x^{1/2})$   $y'' = (L - X(\frac{L}{K})^{1/2})^{1/2} (K - X(\frac{K}{L})^{1/2})^{1/2}$ 



y= 1 -X

# Lecture 6: General Equilibrium General Economies with Many Consumers and Production

The set of Pareto efficient allocations will be characterized by the following maximization problem:



### Lecture 6: General Equilibrium

General Economies with Many Consumers and Production Solving the Maximization Problem

Theorem Suppose that utility functions are strictly monotone, differentiable, and quasi-concave. Suppose also that  $(\hat{x},\hat{z})$  is an interior allocation. Then  $(\hat{x},\hat{z})$  is Pareto efficient if and only if all of the following  $x_i$  is the suppose  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  in the following  $x_i$  is the following  $x_i$  in the following

hald.

1 For every  $\ell \neq \ell'$ , marginal rates of substitution of any pair of commodities are equalized across

$$\frac{\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial u_2}(\hat{x}_1^1,\ldots,\hat{x}_L^1)}{\frac{\partial u_2}{\partial u_3}(\hat{x}_1^1,\ldots,\hat{x}_L^1)} = \frac{\frac{\partial u_2}{\partial u_3}(\hat{x}_1^2,\ldots,\hat{x}_L^2)}{\frac{\partial u_2}{\partial u_3}(\hat{x}_1^2,\ldots,\hat{x}_L^2)} = \cdots = \frac{\frac{\partial u_1}{\partial u_2}(\hat{x}_1^1,\ldots,\hat{x}_L^1)}{\frac{\partial u_2}{\partial u_3}(\hat{x}_1^1,\ldots,\hat{x}_L^1)}.$$

2. For every  $l \neq l'$ , technical rates of substitution of inputs  $\ell$  and l' are equalized across firms:

$$\frac{\frac{\partial l_1}{\partial x_\ell}(k_1^l,\dots,k_\ell^l)}{\frac{\partial l_1}{\partial x_\ell}(k_1^l,\dots,k_\ell^l)} = \frac{\frac{\partial l_2}{\partial x_\ell}(k_1^l,\dots,k_\ell^l)}{\frac{\partial l_2}{\partial x_\ell}(k_1^l,\dots,k_\ell^l)} = \dots = \frac{\frac{\partial l_2}{\partial x_\ell}(k_1^l,\dots,k_\ell^l)}{\frac{\partial l_2}{\partial x_\ell}(k_1^l,\dots,k_\ell^l)}$$

3) For every  $\ell \neq \ell'$ , the marginal rates of transformation is equal to the marginal rates of

$$\frac{\partial f_j}{\partial z_j}(\hat{z}_j^j, \dots, \hat{z}_j^j) \stackrel{\partial a_j}{\partial z_j}(\hat{x}_j^j, \dots, \hat{x}_j^j) \stackrel{\partial a_j}{\partial z_j}(\hat{x}_j^j, \dots, \hat{x}_j^j)$$

$$\frac{\frac{\partial f_{i}}{\partial z_{ij}}(\hat{z}_{i}^{l},\ldots,\hat{z}_{i}^{l})}{\frac{\partial f_{i}}{\partial z_{ij}}(\hat{z}_{i}^{l},\ldots,\hat{z}_{i}^{l})} = \frac{\frac{\partial z_{i}}{\partial z_{ij}}(\hat{z}_{i}^{l},\ldots,\hat{z}_{i}^{l})}{\frac{\partial z_{i}}{\partial z_{ij}}(\hat{z}_{i}^{l},\ldots,\hat{z}_{i}^{l})} = \cdots = \frac{\frac{\partial z_{i}}{\partial z_{ij}}(\hat{z}_{i}^{l}^{l},\ldots,\hat{z}_{i}^{l})}{\frac{\partial z_{i}}{\partial z_{ij}}(\hat{z}_{i}^{l},\ldots,\hat{z}_{i}^{l})}.$$