

Lecture2

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Lecture2

Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

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Lecture 2: General Equilibrium

Cobb-Douglas

Using calculus  
Perfect substitutes  
Perfect complements

Cobb-Douglas

$$u_A(x, y) = x^\alpha y^{1-\alpha}$$


$$u_B(x, y) = x^\beta y^{1-\beta}$$

For graph suppose

$$\alpha = 0.7$$

$$\beta = 0.3$$

$$\omega^A = (1, 1)$$

$$\omega^B = (1, 1)$$


Cobb-Douglas

► Indifference curves must be tangent (formalize this later)

► Thus, the MRS must be equalized across the two consumers

$$MRS_{x,y}^A = \frac{\frac{\partial u_A^{1-\alpha}}{\partial x}}{\frac{\partial u_A^{1-\alpha}}{\partial y}} = \frac{\alpha x^{\alpha-1} y^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha x^\alpha y^{-\alpha}} = \frac{\alpha y^A}{1-\alpha x^A}$$

$$MRS_{x,y}^B = \frac{\frac{\partial u_B^{1-\beta}}{\partial x}}{\frac{\partial u_B^{1-\beta}}{\partial y}} = \frac{\beta x^{\beta-1} y^{1-\beta}}{1-\beta x^\beta y^{-\beta}} = \frac{\beta y^B}{1-\beta x^B}$$

*Handwritten notes:* "vires" (twice) in green next to the MRS equations. "THIS" in red with an arrow pointing to the MRS equations. "APARTE" in green with a circle around the MRS equations. "X^A + X^B = Z" and "y^A + y^B = Z" in blue with arrows pointing to the right. "X^B = Z - X^A" and "y^B = Z - y^A" in blue with arrows pointing to the right.

Cobb-Douglas

But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

*Handwritten notes:* "THIS" in red with an arrow pointing to the MRS equations from the previous slide. "APARTE" in green with a circle around the MRS equations from the previous slide. "X^A + X^B = Z" and "y^A + y^B = Z" in blue with arrows pointing to the right. "X^B = Z - X^A" and "y^B = Z - y^A" in blue with arrows pointing to the right. "Z - X^A" in red with a circle around it. "y^A = (beta(1-alpha) / (1-beta) alpha) \* (Z - y^A) X^A" in red. "Z y^A - X^A y^A = Z beta / alpha \* (1-alpha) / (1-beta) X^A - (beta(1-alpha) / (1-beta)) y^A X^A" in red.

$$(1-\beta)\alpha$$

$$zy^A - X_A y_A = z \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\beta} X^A - \frac{\beta(1-\alpha)}{\alpha(1-\beta)} y^A X^A$$

$$zy^A - X_A y_A + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \frac{(1-\alpha)}{1-\beta} y^A X^A = z \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\beta} X^A$$

$$y^A \left( z - X_A + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\beta} X_A \right) = z \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\beta} X^A$$

$$y^A = \frac{z \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\beta} X^A}{z - X_A + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\beta} X_A}$$

Cobb-Douglas  
But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A}$$

Cobb-Douglas  
But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$

$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A}$$

$$y^A = x^A \cdot \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \left( \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A} \right)$$

Cobb-Douglas  
But we haven't used the fact that

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$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A}$$

$$y^A = x^A \cdot \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \left( \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A} \right)$$

$$y^A \left( 1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \frac{x^A}{\omega_x - x^A} \right) = x^A \cdot \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \frac{\omega_y}{\omega_x - x^A}$$

Cobb-Douglas  
But we haven't used the fact that

$$x^A + x^B = \omega_x$$


$$y^A + y^B = \omega_y$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{y^A}{x^A} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A}$$

$$y^A = x^A \cdot \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \left( \frac{\omega_y - y^A}{\omega_x - x^A} \right)$$

$$y^A \left( 1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \frac{x^A}{\omega_x - x^A} \right) = x^A \cdot \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \frac{\omega_y}{\omega_x - x^A}$$

Then:

$$y^A = \frac{(1-\alpha)\beta\omega_y x^A}{\alpha\omega_x - \alpha x^A - \alpha\beta\omega_x + \beta x^A}$$


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MAX  $U_B$  s.t.  $U_A \geq \bar{U}_A$   
 $x_A + x_B \leq \omega_x^A + \omega_x^B$   
 $y_A + y_B \leq \omega_y^A + \omega_y^B$  } **Factorial**

Using calculus

Essentially in this exercise we are doing the following:

$$\max_{(x^A, y^A), (x^B, y^B)} u_A(x^A, y^A) \text{ such that}$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) \geq \bar{u}_B$$

$$x^B + x^A \leq \omega_x$$

$$y^B + y^A \leq \omega_y$$

Theorem

Consider an Edgeworth Box economy and suppose that all consumers have strictly monotone utility functions. Then a feasible allocation  $(x^A, y^A, x^B, y^B)$  is Pareto efficient if and only if it solves

$$\max_{(x^A, y^A), (x^B, y^B)} u_A(x^A, y^A) \text{ such that}$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) \geq \bar{u}_B$$

$$x^B + x^A \leq \omega_x$$

$$y^B + y^A \leq \omega_y$$

$\rightarrow x^B = \omega_x - x^A$   
 $y^B = \omega_y - y^A$

$$\mathcal{L} = U_A(x_A, y_A) + \lambda_1 (U_B(x_B, y_B) - \bar{U}_B) + \lambda_2 (\omega_x - x_A - x_B) + \lambda_3 (\omega_y - y_A - y_B)$$

Very tempting to use Lagrangeans, no?

We need to assume all consumers have quasi-concave, strictly monotone, differentiable utility functions

Then we can solve:

$$\mathcal{L} = u_A(x^A, y^A) + \lambda (u_B(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A) - \bar{u}_B)$$

$$\mathcal{L} = U_A(x_A, y_A) + \lambda_1 (U_B(\omega_x - x_A, \omega_y - y_A) - \bar{U}_B)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_A} = \frac{\partial U_A(x_A, y_A)}{\partial x_A} + \lambda \frac{\partial U_B(x_B, y_B)}{\partial x_B} \cdot (-1) = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y_A} = \frac{\partial U_A(x_A, y_A)}{\partial y_A} + \lambda \frac{\partial U_B(x_B, y_B)}{\partial y_B} \cdot (-1) = 0$$

Lets take the first order conditions of the above problem. Beginning with  $x^A$ :

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x^A} : \frac{\partial u_A}{\partial x^A}(x^A, y^A) - \lambda \frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x^A}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A) = 0$$

which implies:

$$\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial x^A}(x^A, y^A) = \lambda \frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x^A}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)$$

For  $y^A$ :

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y^A} : \frac{\partial u_A}{\partial y^A}(x^A, y^A) - \lambda \frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y^A}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A) = 0$$

which implies:

$$\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial y^A}(x^A, y^A) = \lambda \frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y^A}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)$$

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial x_A}(x_A, y_A)}{\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial y_A}(x_A, y_A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial x_B}}{\frac{\partial U_B}{\partial y_B}}$$

$TMS_A = TMS_B$

If  $(x^A, y^A, x^B, y^B)$  is Pareto efficient then

$$\frac{\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial x^A}(x^A, y^A)}{\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial y^A}(x^A, y^A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)}{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y^B}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x^B}(x^B, y^B)}{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y^B}(x^B, y^B)}$$

In short  $MRS_{x,y}^A = MRS_{x,y}^B$

This condition is necessary and sufficient

**Theorem**

Suppose that both consumers have utility functions that are quasi-concave and strictly increasing. Suppose that  $(x^A, y^A; \omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)$  is an interior feasible allocation. Then  $(x^A, y^A; \omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)$  is Pareto efficient if and only if

$$\frac{\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial x}(x^A, y^A)}{\frac{\partial u_A}{\partial y}(x^A, y^A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial x}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)}{\frac{\partial u_B}{\partial y}(\omega_x - x^A, \omega_y - y^A)} = \frac{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x}(x^B, y^B)}{\frac{\partial u}{\partial y}(x^B, y^B)}$$

**Intuition**

Suppose that we are at an allocation where  $MRS_{x,y}^A = 2 > MRS_{x,y}^B = 1$ . Can we make both consumers better off?



**Intuition**

Suppose that we are at an allocation where  $MRS_{x,y}^A = 2 > MRS_{x,y}^B = 1$ . Can we make both consumers better off?

- ▶ A gives up 1 unit of y to person B in exchange for unit of x
- ▶ B is indifferent since his  $MRS_{x,y}^B = 1$ .
- ▶ A receives a unit of x and only needs to give one unit of y (he was willing to give two)
- ▶ We have reallocated goods to make A strictly better off without hurting B

**General case**

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L), \dots, (x_1^I, \dots, x_1^I)\}} & u_1(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L) \text{ such that } u_2(x_2^1, \dots, x_2^L) \geq u_2 \\ & \vdots \\ & u_I(x_1^I, \dots, x_1^I) \geq u_I \\ & x_1^1 + \dots + x_1^I \leq \omega_1 \\ & \vdots \\ & x_1^1 + \dots + x_1^I \leq \omega_L \end{aligned}$$

**General case**

**Theorem**  
Suppose that all utility functions are strictly increasing and quasi-concave. Suppose also that  $\{(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L), \dots, (x_1^I, \dots, x_1^I)\}$  is a feasible interior allocation. Then  $\{(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L), \dots, (x_1^I, \dots, x_1^I)\}$  is Pareto efficient if and only if  $\{(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L), \dots, (x_1^I, \dots, x_1^I)\}$  exhausts all resources and for all pairs of goods  $l, l'$ ,

$$MRS_{l,l'}^1(x_1^1, \dots, x_1^L) = \dots = MRS_{l,l'}^I(x_1^I, \dots, x_1^I).$$

$x, y, z$   
Agents: A, B, C

$$\begin{aligned} MRS_{x,y}^A &= MRS_{x,y}^B = MRS_{x,y}^C \\ MRS_{x,z}^A &= MRS_{x,z}^B = MRS_{x,z}^C \\ MRS_{y,z}^A &= MRS_{y,z}^B = MRS_{y,z}^C \end{aligned}$$

~~$MRS_{x,y,z}^A = MRS_{x,y,z}^B = MRS_{x,y,z}^C$~~

- ▶ Utility functions must be strictly increasing, quasi-concave, and differentiable!


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




Suppose that

$u_A(x^A, y^A) = 2x^A + y^A$   
 $u_B(x^B, y^B) = x^B + y^B$   
 $\omega^A = (1, 1)$   
 $\omega^B = (1, 1)$




$$J = 2x^A + y^A + \lambda \left( \bar{U}_B - \frac{(z-x^A)}{x^B} - \frac{(z-y^A)}{y^B} \right)$$

$$\frac{\partial J}{\partial x^A} = 2 + \lambda = 0$$



Perfect substitutes



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Perfect complements


Suppose that

$$u_A(x^A, y^A) = \min(x^A, 2y^A)$$

$$u_B(x^B, y^B) = \min(2x^B, y^B)$$

$$\omega^A = (3, 1)$$

$$\omega^B = (1, 3)$$






$$\hookrightarrow x^A = 2y^A \rightsquigarrow y^A = \frac{x^A}{2}$$








$$2x^B = y^B$$

$$\hookrightarrow 2(4 - x^A) = 4 - y^A$$


$$= 8 - 2x^A = 4 - y^A$$

$$\boxed{y^A = 2x^A - 4}$$






Make A as well as we can without making B worse off




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Make A as well as we can without making B worse off




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
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
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






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► What about:  $u_A(x, y) = x^2 + y^2$ ,  $u_B(x, y) = x + y$  ?

► Try it at home!

## Recap

- ▶ We expect all exchanges to happen on the contract curve (hence its name)
- ▶ We expect all **voluntary** exchanges to be in the orange box
- ▶ Can we say more? Not without prices