F Tables and figures controlling for students' preferences

F.1 Main tables

Table F.1: Balance across lottery winners and losers, controlling for students' preferences

	Admin data		Phone survey #1		Phone survey #2	
	Control mean (1)	Treatment differential (2)	Control mean (3)	Treatment differential (4)	Control mean (5)	Treatment differential (6)
Female	0.49	0.00	0.50	-0.02	0.49	-0.02
	(0.50)	(0.01)	(0.50)	(0.02)	(0.50)	(0.02)
	[4,932]	[10,079]	[2,222]	[3,831]	[1,203]	[2,057]
Age (Jan 1st, 2019)	4.06	-0.01*	4.00	-0.02**	3.98	-0.02
	(0.93)	(0.01)	(0.92)	(0.01)	(0.89)	(0.02)
	[4,932]	[10,079]	[2,222]	[3,831]	[1,203]	[2,057]
Scheduled Caste	0.17	-0.00	0.17	0.01	0.16	0.01
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.37)	(0.01)	(0.37)	(0.02)
	[4,932]	[10,079]	[2,222]	[3,831]	[1,203]	[2,057]
Scheduled Tribe	0.17	-0.00	0.12	-0.00	0.10	0.01
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.32)	(0.01)	(0.30)	(0.01)
	[4,932]	[10,079]	[2,222]	[3,831]	[1,203]	[2,057]
Other Backward Class	0.54	-0.00	0.58	-0.00	0.60	-0.01
	(0.50)	(0.01)	(0.49)	(0.02)	(0.49)	(0.02)
	[4,932]	[10,079]	[2,222]	[3,831]	[1,203]	[2,057]
Rural	0.40	-0.00	0.32	0.00	0.31	0.00
	(0.49)	(0.00)	(0.46)	(0.00)	(0.46)	(0.00)
	[4,932]	[10,079]	[2,222]	[3,831]	[1,203]	[2,057]
Surveyed			0.44	0.02**	0.26	0.03***
			(0.50)	(0.01)	(0.44)	(0.01)
			[4,932]	[10,079]	[4,932]	[10,079]
Allocated a seat			0.21	0.74***	0.17	0.78***
			(0.41)	(0.01)	(0.38)	(0.02)
			[2,173]	[3,796]	[1,088]	[2,138]

Notes: Odd columns contain the control (lottery losers) mean, standard deviation of the mean (in parentheses), and the number of observations in the control group (in square brackets). Even columns report the treatment effect (difference between lottery winners and losers), the standard error of the effect (in parentheses), and the number of observations in the treatment group (in square brackets). Columns 1–2 focus on the full sample. The p-value of the null hypothesis that the differences across all the observable applicant characteristics (Column 2) are jointly zero is .81. Columns 3–4 focus on those who answered our first phone survey. The p-value of the null hypothesis that the differences across all the observable applicant characteristics (Column 4) are jointly zero is .25. Columns 5–6 focus on those who answered our second phone survey. The p-value of the null hypothesis that the differences across all observable applicant characteristics (Column 6) are jointly zero is .62. All treatment estimates control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.2: Effect on the extensive margin of enrollment, controlling for students' preferences

	Any school				Private school			
	Control mean	ITT	CCM	LATE	Control mean	ITT	CCM	LATE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
All	0.86	0.14***	0.83	0.19***	0.82	0.18***	0.78	0.24***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
		[6,053]		[5,969]		[6,002]		[5,928]
Nursery	0.81	0.19***	0.77	0.25***	0.79	0.21***	0.74	0.29***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
		[3,103]		[3,062]		[3,070]		[3,035]
Kindergarten	0.87	0.13***	0.85	0.17***	0.82	0.18***	0.79	0.24***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
		[1,766]		[1,741]		[1,756]		[1,735]
Grade 1	0.98	0.02**	0.97	0.03**	0.91	0.09***	0.89	0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
		[1,184]		[1,166]		[1,176]		[1,158]

Notes: Columns 1 and 5 report the control (lottery losers) mean and the standard error of the mean (in parentheses). Columns 2 and 6 list the itent-to-treat (ITT) effect (difference between lottery winners and losers), the standard error of the effect (in parentheses), and the number of observations used to estimate the effect (in square brackets). Columns 3 and 7 report the control complier mean (CCM) — the mean outcomes for lottery loser compliers — and the standard error of the CCM (in parentheses). Columns 4 and 8 list the local average treatment effect (LATE) of being assigned an RTE seat (instrumented by winning the lottery), the standard error of the effect (in parentheses), and the number of observations used to estimate the effect (in square brackets). All treatment estimates control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.3: Effect on the characteristics of the school a child attends, controlling for students' preferences

	English medium	% students ST & SC	Facility index	Enrollment	Teachers	PTR	Fees
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: ITT							
Lottery seat	.054*	.021	-.004	47***	1.1**	2.5**	1,470***
	(.03)	(.79)	(.037)	(14)	(.58)	(.98)	(379)
N. of obs.	1,166	813	820	772	799	760	874
Control mean	0.56	32.27	0.71	316.34	13.35	23.57	6,456.20
Control mean | enrolled	0.57	33.01	0.73	324.31	13.66	24.16	6,589.78
% Enrolled (Control)	98.71	97.74	97.78	97.54	97.73	97.56	97.97
Panel B: LATE							
Allocated an RTE seat	.076*	.18	-.017	60***	1.4*	4***	2,010***
	(.042)	(1.1)	(.051)	(19)	(.78)	(1.4)	(501)
N. of obs.	1,151	805	812	764	791	752	865
CCM	0.51	32.98	0.72	339.96	14.57	23.61	5,955.10
CCM | enrolled	0.52	33.68	0.74	349.05	14.97	24.16	6,175.24
% Enrolled (CCM)	97.45	97.73	97.79	97.63	97.62	97.57	96.24

Notes: Panel A presents the ITT effects of winning a seat through the lottery on different characteristic of the school the child is enrolled in. Panel B presents the LATE of being allocated an RTE (instrumenting with the outcome of the lottery) on different characteristics of the school the child is enrolled in. CCM denotes the mean outcomes for lottery loser compliers. In Column 1, the outcome is whether the child attends an English medium schools or not. In Column 2, the outcome is the percentage of enrollment taken by Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the school the child attends. In Column 3, the outcome is a principal component analysis (PCA) facility index based on whether the school has computer assisted learning, a homeroom, electricity, a library, a playground, a solid building, a boundary wall, functioning toilets, and solid classrooms. In Columns 4-6 the outcomes are enrollment, number of teachers, and the pupil-teacher ratio (PTR). All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.4: Effect on fees, controlling for students' preferences

| | INR | | | |
	All	NU	KG	Grd 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: ITT				
Lottery seat	3,281***	4,900***	2,151***	1,470***
	(215)	(351)	(328)	(379)
Control mean	5,628	5,826	4,869	6,456
Control mean in private	7,615	9,240	6,249	7,294
% out of school (control)	20	33	15	2
% in public (control)	6.3	3.9	7.2	9.5
N. of obs.	4,499	2,171	1,454	874
Panel B: LATE				
Allocated an RTE seat	4,278***	6,185***	2,852***	2,010***
	(290)	(482)	(446)	(501)
CCM	5,470	5,983	4,468	5,955
CCM in private	7,927	10,059	6,011	7,019
% out of school (CCM)	17	23	15	2.5
% in public (CCM)	4.7	2.7	6	8.4
N. of obs.	4,469	2,161	1,443	865

Notes: Fee information comes from administrative data. Students in public schools or not enrolled in school are assigned zero fees. Panel A presents the ITT effect of winning a lottery seat. Panel B presents the LATE of being allocated an RTE (instrumenting with the outcome of the lottery) on the market price of the school a child attends. All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. CCM denotes the mean outcomes for lottery loser compliers. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.5: Effect on enrollment in top choice controlling for students'
preferences

	All	NU	KG	Grd 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lottery seat at first choice	.53***	.6***	.47***	.41***
	(.014)	(.018)	(.024)	(.034)
N. of obs.	5,360	2,782	1,605	973
Control mean	0.42	0.35	0.47	0.53
Control mean | enrolled	0.49	0.44	0.55	0.53
Control mean | enrolled & no RTE seat	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.59
% Enrolled (Control)	84.67	79.01	86.09	98.23
% RTE seat (Control)	26.78	29.32	23.25	25.23

Notes: This table presents the ITT effects of winning a place in the first-choice school through the lottery on the likelihood of enrolling in this top-choice school. All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.6: Effect on government expenditure, controlling for students' preferences

	INR			
	All	NU	KG	Grd 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Market price				
Allocated an RTE seat	4,278***	6,185***	2,852***	2,010***
	(290)	(482)	(446)	(501)
CCM	5,470	5,983	4,468	5,955
CCM in private	7,927	10,059	6,011	7,019
% out of school (CCM)	17	23	15	2.5
% in public (CCM)	4.7	2.7	6	8.4
N. of obs.	4,469	2,161	1,443	865
Panel B: Reimbursed fee				
Allocated an RTE seat	6,008***	6,761***	5,149***	5,636***
	(71)	(99)	(112)	(153)
N. of obs.	4,469	2,161	1,443	865
Panel C: Non-limit reimbursed fee				
Allocated an RTE seat	9,748***	12,169***	7,319***	7,965***
	(308)	(504)	(469)	(527)
N. of obs.	4,469	2,161	1,443	865

Notes: Fee information comes from administrative data. Students in public schools or not enrolled in school are assigned zero fees. Panel A presents the LATE of being allocated an RTE seat (instrumenting with the outcome of the lottery) on the market price of the school a child attends. Panel B presents the LATE of being allocated an RTE seat (instrumenting with the outcome of the lottery) on the reimbursed fee (set to zero for children without an RTE seat). Panel C presents the LATE of being allocated an RTE (instrumenting with the outcome of the lottery) on the hypothetical reimbursed fee in the absence of the maximum reimbursement limit (set to zero for children without an RTE seat). All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. CCM denotes the mean outcomes for lottery loser compliers. Table F.14 presents the ITT estimates of winning a lottery seat. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

F.2 Appendix tables

Table F.7: Attrition by child characteristics, controlling for students' preferences

	Survey #1	Survey #2
	(1)	(2)
Female	.0042	.005
	(.0083)	(.0073)
Age (Jan 1st, 2019)	-.015	-.0097
	(.013)	(.011)
Scheduled Caste	-.037**	-.024
	(.018)	(.016)
Scheduled Tribe	-.074***	-.065***
	(.019)	(.017)
Other Backward Class	-.012	.0011
	(.016)	(.014)
Rural	.042	.031
	(.038)	(.033)
N. of obs.	15,011	15,011
Outcome mean	.43	.25

Notes: The outcome is whether we were able to conduct the interview (=1). All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.8: Compliance, controlling for students' preferences

	Allotted an RTE seat			
	All	NU	KG	Grd 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Allocated a seat	.77***	.78***	.76***	.77***
	(.011)	(.015)	(.021)	(.026)
N. of obs.	5,969	3,062	1,741	1,166
Control mean	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.18

Notes: This table presents the effect of winning a lottery seat on being allotted an RTE seat. All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.9: Effect on the extensive margin of enrollment, controlling for the probability of being assigned to a private school: Lee bounds and stratas with low attrition controlling for students' preferences

	Strata without attrition		Low attrition strata			Lee bounds	
	ITT	LATE	Differential attrition	ITT	LATE	ITT	
						LB	UB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: All grades							
Private school (19-20)	0.16***	0.20***	0.00	0.19***	0.24***	0.12	0.26
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
	[367]	[362]	[6,294]	[3,104]	[3,070]	[2,913]	[2,913]
Any school (19-20)	0.11***	0.14***	0.00	0.14***	0.18***	0.08	0.19
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
	[240]	[236]	[6,294]	[3,138]	[3,097]	[2,937]	[2,937]
Panel B: Nursery							
Private school (19-20)	0.18***	0.22***	-0.00	0.22***	0.28***	0.12	0.27
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(-0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
	[146]	[144]	[2,983]	[1,543]	[1,529]	[1,420]	[1,420]
Any school (19-20)	0.16***	0.20***	-0.00	0.19***	0.25***	0.11	0.24
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(-0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
	[150]	[146]	[2,983]	[1,567]	[1,549]	[1,436]	[1,436]
Panel C: Kindergarten							
Private school (19-20)	0.11	0.12	-0.01	0.16***	0.21***	0.13	0.34
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(-0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
	[20]	[20]	[2,098]	[974]	[961]	[914]	[914]
Any school (19-20)	.	.	-0.01	0.12***	0.15***	0.09	0.23
	(.)	(.)	(-0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
	[.]	[.]	[2,098]	[981]	[965]	[920]	[920]
Panel D: Grade 1							
Private school (19-20)	0.13*	0.18*	0.02	0.11***	0.15***	0.09	0.14
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	[68]	[68]	[1,213]	[584]	[577]	[579]	[579]
Any school (19-20)	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.03**	0.04**	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
	[70]	[70]	[1,212]	[588]	[581]	[581]	[581]

Notes: Columns 1–2 report the results restricting the sample to strata without attrition. Column 1 shows the ITT effect of winning the lottery, and Column 2 the LATE of being assigned an RTE seat (instrumented with winning the lottery). Columns 3–5 show the results after dropping the 25% of the strata with the most differential attrition. Column 3 shows the results of the differential attrition, Column 4 the ITT effect, and Column 5 the LATE of being assigned an RTE seat. Columns 6–7 show Lee (2009) style bounds — Column 6 has the lower bound (LB), while Column 7 has the upper bound for (UB) — for the ITT effect of winning the lottery. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations in the treatment effects estimates is in square brackets. All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.10: Heterogeneity on school enrollment ITT, controlling for the probability of being assigned to a private school and students' preferences

	Any school (19-20)		Private school (19-20)	
	All	Grd 1	All	Grd 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Heterogeneity by gender				
Lottery seat	.13***	.014	.18***	.098***
	(.011)	(.011)	(.013)	(.023)
Female	-.0046	-.007	-.00031	.02
	(.015)	(.012)	(.017)	(.027)
Lottery seat × Female	.0067	.008	.0018	-.025
	(.015)	(.012)	(.017)	(.028)
N. of obs.	6,053	1,184	6,002	1,176
Control mean	.87	.99	.83	.92
Panel B: Heterogeneity by parental education				
Lottery seat	.14***	.02**	.19***	.089***
	(.0091)	(.009)	(.01)	(.017)
Mother HS	.045**	.012	.06**	.045
	(.021)	(.0076)	(.023)	(.037)
Lottery seat × Mother HS	-.05**	-.019**	-.068***	-.043
	(.022)	(.0096)	(.025)	(.042)
N. of obs.	5,858	1,152	5,812	1,143
Control mean	.87	.99	.83	.92
Panel C: Heterogeneity by caste				
Lottery seat	.14***	.015	.17***	.074**
	(.019)	(.015)	(.022)	(.034)
Other Backward Class (OBC)	.0025	.016	-.0041	.033
	(.02)	(.011)	(.023)	(.034)
Scheduled Tribe (ST)	-.016	.0043	-.014	.02
	(.028)	(.014)	(.032)	(.043)
Scheduled Caste (SC)	-.041	-.045	-.073**	-.11**
	(.026)	(.03)	(.03)	(.053)
Lottery seat × OBC	-.016	-.013	-.0099	-.024
	(.021)	(.013)	(.024)	(.036)
Lottery seat × ST	-.0023	-.001	.0024	-.0081
	(.028)	(.016)	(.033)	(.048)
Lottery seat × SC	.02	.046	.053*	.12**
	(.027)	(.033)	(.031)	(.057)
N. of obs.	6,053	1,184	6,002	1,176
Control mean	.87	.99	.83	.92

Notes: This table presents the ITT estimates of being assigned a seat by winning the lottery. The outcome in Columns 1–2 is whether the child was enrolled in any school in 2019–2020 (=1). The outcome in Columns 3–4 is whether the child was enrolled in a private school in 2019–2020 (=1). Mother HS indicates whether the mother completed high school. Columns 1 and 3 use the full sample, while Columns 2 and 4 use only Grade 1 students. All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.11: Heterogeneity on school enrollment LATE, controlling for the probability of being assigned to a private school and students' preferences

	Any school (19-20)		Private school (19-20)	
	All	Grd 1	All	Grd 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Heterogeneity by gender				
Allocated an RTE seat	.18***	.02	.24***	.14***
	(.015)	(.015)	(.017)	(.033)
Female	-.013	-.009	-.0069	.028
	(.019)	(.016)	(.022)	(.037)
Allocated an RTE seat × Female	.013	.0095	.0061	-.037
	(.02)	(.017)	(.023)	(.04)
N. of obs.	5,969	1,166	5,928	1,158
CCM	.83	.97	.78	.89
Panel B: Heterogeneity by parental education				
Allocated an RTE seat	.2***	.028**	.26***	.12***
	(.013)	(.013)	(.014)	(.024)
Mother HS	.063**	.02*	.085***	.067
	(.027)	(.011)	(.03)	(.048)
Allocated an RTE seat × Mother HS	-.07**	-.027**	-.096***	-.068
	(.029)	(.014)	(.033)	(.057)
N. of obs.	5,783	1,136	5,743	1,127
CCM	.83	.97	.78	.89
Panel C: Heterogeneity by caste				
Allocated an RTE seat	.19***	.025	.23***	.12**
	(.026)	(.024)	(.029)	(.055)
Other Backward Class (OBC)	.001	.02	-.013	.047
	(.026)	(.017)	(.029)	(.049)
Scheduled Caste (SC)	-.051	-.054	-.095**	-.13*
	(.034)	(.04)	(.039)	(.07)
Scheduled Tribe (ST)	-.032	.0045	-.032	.018
	(.037)	(.021)	(.042)	(.062)
Allocated an RTE seat × OBC	-.016	-.021	-.0015	-.056
	(.028)	(.021)	(.032)	(.057)
Allocated an RTE seat × SC	.035	.057	.08*	.14*
	(.037)	(.046)	(.042)	(.081)
Allocated an RTE seat × ST	.016	-.004	.023	-.02
	(.04)	(.025)	(.046)	(.072)
N. of obs.	5,969	1,166	5,928	1,158
CCM	.83	.97	.78	.89

Notes: This table presents the LATE of being assigned an RTE place (instrumented by winning the lottery). CCM denotes the mean outcomes for lottery loser compliers. The outcome in Columns 1–2 is whether the child was enrolled in any school in 2019–2020 (=1). The outcome in Columns 3–4 is whether the child was enrolled in a private school in 2019–2020 (=1). Mother HS indicates whether the mother completed high school. Columns 1 and 3 use the full sample, while Columns 2 and 4 use only Grade 1 students. All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Table F.10 provides the ITT effect of winning a lottery seat. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.12: Effect of winning different lottery seats on enrollment in the top-choice school, controlling for students' preferences

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Won lottery	.48***					
	(.014)					
Won seat in first choice		.53***	.72***	.66***	.7***	.66***
		(.014)	(.023)	(.026)	(.039)	(.041)
Won seat in second choice				-.28***	-.26***	-.29***
				(.036)	(.069)	(.07)
Won seat in third choice						-.29***
						(.057)
N. of obs.	5,360	5,360	1,461	1,461	555	555
Sample	Full	Full	≥ 2 choices	≥ 2 choices	≥ 3 choices	≥ 3 choices

Notes: This table presents the effect of winning different lottery seats on the likelihood of enrolling in the top-choice school. All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.13: Effect on the diversity of the student body, controlling for students' preferences

	% SC (1)	% ST (2)	% SC+ST (3)
Panel A: ITT			
Lottery seat	.055	-1	-.99
	(.81)	(.96)	(1.3)
Scheduled Tribe	-.11	-1.1	-1.3
	(.9)	(1.4)	(1.8)
Scheduled Caste	2.8**	-.15	2.7
	(1.3)	(1)	(1.9)
Other Backward Class	-.62	-.91	-1.5
	(1)	(1)	(1.6)
Lottery seat × Scheduled Tribe	.13	1.3	1.5
	(.9)	(1.4)	(1.7)
Lottery seat × Scheduled Caste	-1.8	.14	-1.6
	(1.3)	(1.1)	(1.9)
Lottery seat × Other Backward Class	1.1	1.2	2.2
	(1)	(1)	(1.5)
N. of obs.	818	818	818
Control mean	12.82	15.87	28.69
Control mean | enrolled	13.11	16.23	29.34
% Enrolled (Control)	97.78	97.78	97.78
Panel B: LATE			
Allocated an RTE seat	.37	-1.5	-1.2
	(1.3)	(1.6)	(2.1)
Allocated an RTE seat × Scheduled Caste	-2.7	.31	-2.4
	(1.9)	(1.7)	(2.8)
Allocated an RTE seat × Scheduled Tribe	-.17	1.9	1.8
	(1.4)	(2.2)	(2.7)
Allocated an RTE seat × Other Backward Class	1.3	1.7	3
	(1.5)	(1.6)	(2.3)
Scheduled Caste	3.6*	-.27	3.3
	(1.9)	(1.6)	(2.7)
Scheduled Tribe	.12	-1.7	-1.5
	(1.3)	(2.1)	(2.7)
Other Backward Class	-.9	-1.4	-2.3
	(1.4)	(1.5)	(2.2)
N. of obs.	810	810	810
CCM	12.72	16.62	29.33
CCM | enrolled	12.99	16.94	29.94
% Enrolled (CCM)	97.76	97.76	97.76

Notes: Panel A presents the ITT effects of winning a seat through the lottery on the proportion of students from Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). Panel B presents the LATE of being allocated an RTE (instrumenting with the outcome of the lottery) on the proportion of students from SC and ST. CCM denotes the mean outcomes for lottery loser compliers. All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.

Table F.14: Intent-to-treat effect on government expenditure, controlling for students' preferences

	INR			
	All	NU	KG	Grd 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Market price				
Lottery seat	3,281***	4,900***	2,151***	1,470***
	(215)	(351)	(328)	(379)
Control mean	5,628	5,826	4,869	6,456
Control mean in private	7,615	9,240	6,249	7,294
% out of school (control)	20	33	15	2
% in public (control)	6.3	3.9	7.2	9.5
N. of obs.	4,499	2,171	1,454	874
Panel B: Reimbursed fee				
Lottery seat	4,580***	5,349***	3,789***	4,174***
	(84)	(121)	(132)	(193)
N. of obs.	4,499	2,171	1,454	874
Panel C: Non-limit reimbursed fee				
Lottery seat	7,431***	9,615***	5,404***	5,884***
	(243)	(384)	(368)	(465)
N. of obs.	4,499	2,171	1,454	874

Notes: Fee information comes from administrative data. Students in public schools or not enrolled in school are assigned zero fees. Panel A presents the ITT effects of being allocated an RTE through the lottery on the market price of the school a child attends. Panel B presents the ITT effects of being allocated an RTE through the lottery on the reimbursed fee (set to zero for children without an RTE seat). Panel C presents the ITT effects of being allocated an RTE through the lottery on the hypothetical reimbursed fee in the absence of the maximum reimbursement limit (set to zero for children without an RTE seat). All regressions control for "full preference" list fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.